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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE END OF WORK
Camilla A. Hrdy*
Abstract
The conventional wisdom is that intellectual property (IP) is good for 
jobs. Indeed, according to legislators and the U.S. patent office, IP 
“creates jobs.” But this is not quite right. A primary function of IP is to 
increase the amount of innovation in the economy. Yet a significant 
subset of the innovations protected by IP rights, from self-service kiosks 
to self-driving cars, are in fact labor-saving and indeed labor-displacing. 
They reduce the amount of paid human labor required to complete a task. 
Therefore, to the extent IP is successful at incentivizing innovation, IP 
actually contributes to job loss. More precisely, IP contributes to what 
this Article terms “technological un/employment”: job loss and job 
creation resulting from technological change. Commentators concerned 
about the “end of work” have suggested using taxation to slow down the 
pace of automation and to provide aid to displaced workers. But this 
Article yields another surprising insight: IP law itself could be designed 
to effectuate similar goals, either alone or in coordination with the tax 
system. For example, rather than taxing businesses that employ robots, 
legislators could deny patents on robots or tax IP owners and use the 
proceeds to fund social programs or a universal basic income. IP’s 
relationship to technological un/employment and the implications for 
public policy may seem evident in hindsight. Yet the connection has been 
overlooked. Lawyers and academics who study IP must pay more 
attention.
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“In [the year 2014], IP-intensive industries directly and 
indirectly supported 45.5 million jobs, about 30 percent of 
all employment.”1
U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 2016
“We are being afflicted with a new disease of which some 
readers may not yet have heard the name, but of which they 
will hear a great deal in the years to come—namely, 
technological unemployment.”2
John Maynard Keynes, Economic Possibilities
for our Grandchildren, 1930
INTRODUCTION
In 1589, William Lee visited Queen Elizabeth I, seeking a patent for 
his new stocking frame knitting machine.3 The machine’s major benefit 
was that it could reduce the number of hours spent hand-knitting clothing 
and other cloth items.4 The Queen refused to grant the patent, observing,
“Thou aimest high, Master Lee. Consider thou what the invention could 
do to my poor subjects. It would assuredly bring to them ruin by depriving 
them of employment, thus making them beggars.”5 Lee thereafter failed 
to obtain a patent in France and again in England, when Elizabeth’s 
successor James I also denied Lee’s patent for the same reason: 
Mechanization of knitting would put people out of work.6 A patent to 
                                                                                                                     
1. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE U.S. ECONOMY:
2016 UPDATE ii (2016).
2. JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, Economic Possibilities for Our Grandchildren, in ESSAYS IN 
PERSUASION 192, 196 (Classic House Books, 2009) (1931).
3. DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES A. ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS FAIL: THE ORIGINS OF 
POWER, PROSPERITY, AND POVERTY 182 (2012).
4. Id.
5. Id. at 182–83.
6. Id. 
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operate the technology in the realm would therefore be contrary to the 
public interest.7
Move forward in time over four hundred years. The U.S. Patent & 
Trademark Office (USPTO) recently issued a report on the impact of 
intellectual property (IP) on the economy and the workforce.8 According 
to the USPTO report, “IP-intensive industries”9 create more jobs than 
other industries, and wages are forty-six percent higher.10 The report’s 
conclusions, if true,11 appear to vindicate the views of many 
policymakers—that functioning intellectual property laws “create 
jobs.”12
Which story is right? Do intellectual property rights “create jobs”? Or 
do intellectual property rights “depriv[e] [people] of employment, thus 
making them beggars”?13 This Article considers this question and seeks 
to bring the broader discussion of intellectual property’s impact on human 
work into the field.14 The Article’s main insight is as follows: Intellectual 
property may be partly responsible for job creation for people who work 
                                                                                                                     
7. Id. 
8. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 1, at 1.
9. The USPTO report defines IP-intensive industries as industries that rely more heavily
on intellectual property than others. The report measures patents, trademarks, and copyrights, but 
not trade secrets. See id. Empirical studies on trade secrets are relatively rare for various reasons. 
See Michael Risch, Empirical Methods in Trade Secret Research, in II RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON 
THE ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (Peter S. Mennell & David L. Schwartz eds., 
forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 1, 5), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2658685 [https://perma.cc/6AK3-7RQQ].
10. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 1, at 1; see also Stuart J.H. Graham et 
al., Business Dynamics of Innovating Firms: Linking U.S. Patents with Administrative Data on 
Workers and Firms, 27 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 372, 373 (2018) (“We find patenting firms, 
particularly young patenting firms, disproportionally contribute jobs to the U.S. economy.”).
11. The USPTO report’s conclusions and methodology have been critiqued by several 
commentators. See, e.g., Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Patent Experimentalism, 101 VA. L. REV. 65, 
121 (2015); see also Camilla A. Hrdy, Intellectual Property and Jobs, WRITTEN DESCRIPTION
(Mar. 5, 2018), https://writtendescription.blogspot.com/2018/03/intellectual-property-and-
jobs.html [https://perma.cc/A8BU-CMGT] (discussing the ways in which the report was flawed). 
 12. In a representative quote, Senator Leahy stated to his colleagues that by strengthening 
the patent system, the Leahy–Smith America Invents Act of 2011 (AIA) would “create jobs, 
improve products, and reduce costs for American companies and American consumers.” See 
Patrick Leahy, Leahy: Now is the Time to Act on Patent Reform, PATRICK LEAHY (Mar. 8, 2011), 
https://www.leahy.senate.gov/press/leahy-now-is-the-time-to-act-on-patent-reform 
[https://perma.cc/23U4-ZJ7U].  
 13. ACEMOGLU & ROBINSON, supra note 3, at 183.  
 14. The impact of intellectual property on employment is rarely considered in the legal 
literature. Professor Mark Lemley recently tackled a related issue: What is the role of intellectual 
property in producing artificial scarcity when technology effectively eliminates the cost of 
production? Lemley briefly considered the impact of “post-scarcity” technologies like 3D printing 
on employment. See Mark A. Lemley, IP in a World Without Scarcity, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 460, 
511 (2015).  
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within IP-intensive industries such as motion pictures, software, and 
computer systems design.15 But a significant subset of the innovations 
protected by intellectual property, from self-service kiosks to self-driving 
cars, are labor-saving, and in many cases also labor-displacing. These 
innovations drastically reduce the amount of paid human labor required 
to complete a task. These innovations, in turn, are partly responsible for 
what economists call technological unemployment: job loss resulting 
from technological change.16
Autonomous vehicles provide a striking example. Companies like
Alphabet, Uber, Tesla, and General Motors are competing to perfect 
“self-driving” vehicles that can drive and navigate without human 
drivers.17 These companies rely on intellectual property rights (including 
but not limited to patents) in order to achieve the excess rents of a right 
to exclude others.18 The result is greater profits for owners of intellectual 
property covering self-driving vehicles, and higher wages for the 
roboticists and engineers whose skills are necessary to generate this 
intellectual property.19 But self-driving vehicles, if widely adopted, could 
spell the end of paid employment for taxi drivers, Uber drivers, truck 
drivers, and millions of other people whose jobs entail driving for a 
living.
Are the intellectual property rights that helped give rise to self-driving 
vehicles in some sense responsible for these lost jobs? Are they in some 
sense responsible for the unequal division of rewards between, say, Uber, 
which owns significant intellectual property relating to self-driving 
vehicles,20 and Uber drivers, whose jobs those same inventions will one 
day replace? This Article asserts that to the extent intellectual property is 
successful at incentivizing innovation, the answer to both questions must 
be “yes.” Intellectual property facilitates the process by which technology 
replaces certain jobs and increases the returns from doing so.21
Yet this does not mean that intellectual property, or innovation itself, 
is bad for jobs. It simply means that intellectual property is not all good
for jobs. When legislators highlight intellectual property’s “job creation” 
potential, they must be clearer that intellectual property’s impact on 
employment is double-sided. Both sides of this process—what this 
                                                                                                                     
15. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 1, at 25–29 (listing the major 
industries identified as being “IP-intensive”).  
16. See infra notes 33–36.
17. See infra Part II.C.4.
18. Part II.B explains intellectual property’s right-to-exclude mechanism.
19. See infra Part II.C.4.
20. For a complete list of Uber’s patents, see Patents Assigned to Uber Technologies, 
Inc., JUSTIA PATS. (2018), http://patents.justia.com/assignee/uber-technologies-inc?page=2
[https://perma.cc/5H5K-FJ6B]. For further discussion of self-driving cars, see Part II.C.4.
21. See infra Parts III.C.1–4.
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Article terms “technological un/employment”—must be considered in 
order to understand what is happening in the innovation economy, and in 
order to understand intellectual property’s role in this process. 
This Article fills a major gap in the literature. Labor and employment 
law scholars, as well as tax law scholars, have already begun to address 
workers’ uncertain fate in a world of increasing automation, which is 
arguably one of the major social crises of the day.22 Intellectual property 
scholars, in contrast, have not yet seriously considered the impact of 
intellectual property on human work, despite the fact that intellectual 
property is the legal regime with the strongest connection to technological 
innovation.23 This Article comprehensively covers the topic, and urges 
lawyers and academics to pay more attention—especially in light of the 
alarming political possibilities revealed herein.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I defines what it means for 
innovations to be “labor-displacing” and explains in detail the double-
sided impact that labor-displacing innovations have on employment. This 
part draws on substantial research by labor economists and economic 
historians.24
Part II explains the underappreciated and surprising role of intellectual 
property in producing technological un/employment. Since at least the 
sixteenth century, rulers like Queen Elizabeth I recognized that exclusive 
“privileges” to practice a certain technology within the realm could 
adversely impact employment.25 This part shows that, contrary to
conventional wisdom, intellectual property still has this impact today. It 
increases the overall amount of labor-displacing innovations available for 
use in the economy (called the “Incentive Effect”) and exacerbates the 
unequal distribution of rewards between the owners and generators of 
intellectual property and the workers whom those inventions replace 
(called the “Distribution Effect”).26
                                                                                                                     
22. See, e.g., Cynthia Estlund, What Should We Do After Work? Automation and
Employment Law, 128 YALE L.J. 254, 257 (2018); Brishen Rogers, The Social Costs of Uber, 82 
U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 85, 101 (2015); see also Ryan Abbott & Bret Bogenschneider, Should 
Robots Pay Taxes? Tax Policy in the Age of Automation, 12 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 145, 146–47
(2018) (stating that industry experts are predicting that automation will soon result in substantial 
“technological unemployment”).
23. Professor Lemley’s brief analysis is a notable exception. See Lemley, supra note 14.
Several IP scholars have recently drawn attention to the impact of IP on related socioeconomic 
trends, such as increasing inequality. For an example of this, see generally Colleen Chien, 
Inequality, Innovation, and Patents (Santa Clara Univ. Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 2018-
03, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3157983 [https://perma.cc/BZ2G-ESYA].
24. See infra Part I. I am especially grateful to Professor James Bessen’s historical research 
on the impact of automation on human work. See JAMES BESSEN, LEARNING BY DOING: THE REAL 
CONNECTION BETWEEN INNOVATION, WAGES, AND WEALTH 71 (2015).
25. See ACEMOGLU & ROBINSON, supra note 3, at 182–83.
26. See infra Parts II.C.1 & 4.
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Part III asks what, if anything, policymakers should do differently in 
light of the connection between intellectual property and technological 
un/employment.27 This Part agrees with prior commentators that 
distributive justice, if not necessarily efficiency, weighs in favor of some 
form of intervention.28 Yet the political possibilities are alarming. 
Imagine a future Congress deciding to ban all patents on “self-driving” 
inventions, from cars to data analysis software. This Article rejects such 
blunt tools,29 instead urging moderation. It provides a framework for 
policymakers and concludes that the most promising option may be to 
institute a small tax on certain intellectual property rights that cover
labor-displacing inventions. This would both marginally slow down the 
pace of automation and permit government to redistribute the proceeds to 
displaced workers in the form of cash or social programs, such as skills 
training.30
Part IV concludes. 
I. TECHNOLOGICAL UN/EMPLOYMENT EXPLAINED
The term technological un/employment refers to two sides of an 
economic phenomenon. On one side is technological unemployment: job 
loss brought about by technological change.31 Technological 
unemployment has a long pedigree32 and has been widely studied in the 
fields of economics33 and public policy.34 But all sophisticated thinkers 
on this topic recognize that there is another side to the phenomenon, 
                                                                                                                     
27. See infra Part III.C.
28. See infra Part III.C; see also, e.g., ERIK BRYNJOLFSSON & ANDREW MCAFEE, RACE 
AGAINST THE MACHINE: HOW THE DIGITAL REVOLUTION IS ACCELERATING INNOVATION, DRIVING 
PRODUCTIVITY, AND IRREVERSIBLY TRANSFORMING EMPLOYMENT AND THE ECONOMY 36–47
(2011) (discussing the various “winners” and “losers” of the new machine age).
29. See infra Part III.C.
30. For a similar conclusion about the need for intervention from the employment law 
perspective, see Estlund, supra note 22, at 301–21.
31. See Joel Mokyr et al., The History of Technological Anxiety and the Future of Economic 
Growth: Is This Time Different?, 29 J. ECON. PERSP. 31, 32 (2015); see also MARTIN FORD, RISE 
OF THE ROBOTS: TECHNOLOGY AND THE THREAT OF A JOBLESS FUTURE 29–34 (2015) (discussing 
concerns over job loss as a result of technology in the 1960s and ’70s); JEREMY RIFKIN, THE END
OF WORK: THE DECLINE OF THE GLOBAL LABOR FORCE AND THE DAWN OF THE POST-MARKET ERA
81–89 (1995) (discussing concerns over automaton in the 1960s and ’70s).
32. See generally Mokyr et al., supra note 31, at 33–42 (highlighting the concern that 
technology would replace jobs since the Industrial Revolution).
33. See, e.g., Carl Benedikt Frey & Michael A. Osborne, The Future of Employment: How 
Susceptible Are Jobs To Computerisation?, 114 TECH. FORECASTING & SOC. CHANGE 254, 255
(2016) (discussing a long line of economics research on technology’s impact on jobs).
34. See generally, e.g., DARRELL M. WEST, CTR. FOR TECH. INNOVATION AT BROOKINGS,
WHAT HAPPENS IF ROBOTS TAKE JOBS? THE EMERGING IMPACT OF ROBOTS ON EMPLOYMENT AND 
PUBLIC POLICY (2015) (discussing public policy of technology and unemployment).
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which this Article calls technological employment.35 Technological 
employment refers to job creation brought about by technological 
change—the process by which new technologies, through a variety of 
mechanisms, generate new jobs for humans, even as they take away the 
old.36 Technological un/employment is a term of art used throughout this 
Article to encapsulate both of these phenomena. 
To get a simple preview of how technological un/employment works, 
do a Google search for the phrase “self-driving car jobs.” This will likely
provide results for job postings in the field of self-driving car 
technology37 and articles with titles like “Who's hiring for self-driving car 
jobs.”38 Then do a Google search for the phrase “self-driving car kill 
jobs.” This should provide a host of articles about the negative impact of 
autonomous vehicles on employment and ideas for how to save the jobs 
of human drivers.39
How is it that a single technology can have such a disparate impact on 
social welfare, leading to new jobs for some and job losses for others? 
This Part explains precisely how both sides of this process work. After 
reading this Part, the reader should understand precisely what is meant 
by the term “technological un/employment” in Part II, which explains 
intellectual property’s role in this process. 
A. Labor-Displacing Innovations
Innovation is the driving force behind technological un/employment.
Innovation means a new idea or application of a new idea that generates 
                                                                                                                     
35. The phenomenon of “technological employment” is implicitly recognized in the vast 
literature on technological unemployment. See, e.g., David H. Autor, Why Are There Still So Many 
Jobs? The History and Future of Workplace Automation, 29 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 4–5 (2015) 
(discussing a variety of reasons why there are still jobs despite increasing improvements in 
automation); see also Lewis M. Andrews, Robots Don’t Mean the End of Human Labor, WALL 
STREET J. (Aug. 23, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/robots-dont-mean-the-end-of-human-
labor-1440367275 [https://perma.cc/4M3N-7E43] (“The invention of, say, the internal-
combustion engine put buggy-whip makers and carriage assemblers out of business, but it created 
many more jobs in the manufacture, advertising, sales and maintenance of automobiles.”).
36. See discussion infra Part I.B.
37. Google Self Driving Car Project Jobs, INDEED, https://www.indeed.com/q-Google-
Self-Driving-Car-Project-jobs.html [https://perma.cc/R53Q-K4QF]. 
38. Marco della Cava, Who’s Hiring for Self-Driving Car Jobs, USA TODAY (Oct. 17, 
2016), https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2016/10/17/google-ford-not-only-names-self-
driving-car-jobs/92315206/ [https://perma.cc/CF2F-HXBV].
39. See, e.g., Mark Fahey, Driverless Cars Will Kill the Most Jobs in Select US States,
CNBC (Sept. 2, 2016) https://www.cnbc.com/2016/09/02/driverless-cars-will-kill-the-most-jobs-
in-select-us-states.html [https://perma.cc/YA5H-PGHZ]; Jack Stewart, Robot & Us: Self-Driving 
Trucks Are Coming to Save Lives and Kill Jobs, WIRED (May 5, 2017), https://www.wired.com/
2017/05/robot-us-self-driving-trucks-coming-save-lives-kill-jobs/ [https://perma.cc/KE9A-9NL4].
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value. Value is usually measured in the form of higher profits.40 These
higher profits can be realized in one of two ways: either by generating 
some output (a new product or service) for which consumers are willing 
to pay, or by generating a new way to increase productivity within a 
business (that is, lower cost per output).41 The first type of innovation is 
called a product innovation.42 Birth control, the television, and optical 
lenses are examples of product innovations.43 The second type is called a 
process innovation.44 Using a printing press rather than human scribes 
and using robotic arms rather than human employees to manufacture 
furniture are both examples of process innovations. Process innovations
drastically lower the cost of producing a certain output (writings and 
furniture, respectively) because they require less time, money, and human 
labor.45
1.  Labor-Displacing Versus Labor-Saving Innovations 
Not all innovations reduce the need for human labor. Innovations can 
possess advantages that have nothing to do with labor reduction. An
important subset of innovations are labor-saving. Their primary purpose 
is to reduce the human labor required to complete a task.46 Anesthesia,
                                                                                                                     
40. As in prior work, this Article relies on economists’ broader definition of innovation, 
rather than patent law’s narrower concept of a patentable invention. See Camilla A. Hrdy, Patent 
Nationally, Innovate Locally, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1301, 1310–11 (2016); see also infra note 
42 (defining product innovation).
41. See Hrdy, supra note 40.
42. A product innovation means the introduction of a new product or service, or a 
significant improvement on an existing product or service, for which consumers are willing to 
pay. CHRISTINE GREENHALGH & MARK ROGERS, INNOVATION, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND 
ECONOMIC GROWTH 4 (2010).
43. James Fallows, The 50 Greatest Breakthroughs Since the Wheel, ATLANTIC (Nov. 2013)
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/11/innovations-list/309536/ [https://perma.cc/
P6XN-UWCR].
44. A process innovation means the introduction of a process or method of operation that 
increases productivity (reduces the cost per output). GREENHALGH & ROGERS, supra note 42, at 9. 
Note that a process innovation does not have to be a technique or series of steps. As the Supreme 
Court noted in Diamond v. Diehr, a process innovation can be made possible by a “labor-saving
machine” that allows a business to save labor and lower costs. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 
182–83 n.7 (1980) (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 252, 267–68 (1854)). 
45. GREENHALGH & ROGERS, supra note 42, at 5, 16. Note that a process innovation can be 
tied up with a product innovation. For instance, using the printing press to facilitate copying of 
writings came hand in hand with a new product: printed books. 
46. The Supreme Court has observed the existence and patentability of “labor-saving” 
inventions several times. See, e.g., Diamond, 450 U.S. at 182 n.7 (1981) (“[A]nother may invent 
a labor-saving machine by which this operation or process . . . may be carried on with much saving 
of labor, and expense of fuel . . . .” (quoting Corning, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 268)); see also H.J.
HABAKKUK, AMERICAN AND BRITISH TECHNOLOGY IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY: THE SEARCH 
FOR LABOUR-SAVING INVENTIONS 6 (1962) (“[I]t was scarcity of labour ‘which laid the foundation 
9
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invented in 1846, allowed doctors to alleviate pain during surgery. Its 
purpose was not to reduce the amount of labor it took to perform the 
surgery.47 Further, not all labor-saving innovations are labor-displacing.
For instance, a chairlift, invented in 1936, carries skiers up a hill, saving 
them from having to climb up the hill on their own.48 Unless skiers were 
previously paying other humans to carry them up the hill, the invention 
of the chairlift is labor-saving without being labor-displacing. It does not 
adversely affect the employment prospects of others. However, if the 
labor saved by the innovation would otherwise be performed by a paid 
human worker, then the innovation can be classified as labor-displacing. 
It causes a significant reduction in the amount of paid human labor 
required to complete a task, and thus may lead to significant job
displacement.49
2.  The Role of Automation
Many labor-displacing innovations involve a particular type of 
technological development: automation.50 Automation, which is 
sometimes used interchangeably with “mechanization” or 
“computerisation,” refers generally to using machines to accomplish 
tasks that are, or otherwise would be, performed by humans.51 The agent 
of automation need not be a robot that looks or functions like a human. It 
                                                                                                                     
for the future continuous progress of American industry, by obliging manufacturers to take every 
opportunity of installing new types of labour-saving machinery.’” (quoting BRITISH ESSAYS IN 
AMERICAN HISTORY 264 (H. C. Allen & C. P. Hill eds., 1957))).
47. Fallows, supra note 43.
48. Daniel Engber, Who Made That Ski Lift?, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2014) 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/23/magazine/who-made-that-ski-lift.html
[https://perma.cc/ZSM4-N79H]. 
49. For a discussion on how courts and regulators might determine what is “labor-
displacing,” see infra Part III.C.1. 
50. See James Bessen, How Computer Automation Affects Occupations: Technology, Jobs, 
and Skills 7 (Bos. Univ. Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 15-49, 2016)
(“Automation is not the only way that technology affects occupations . . . [but] automation might 
lead to job losses because it reduces the labor needed to perform tasks.”).
51. See, e.g., id. at 3 (“Automation of an occupation happens when machines take over one 
or more tasks, either completely performing those tasks or reducing the human labor time needed 
to perform them.”); see also Raja Parasuraman et al., A Model for Types and Levels of Human 
Interaction with Automation, 30 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SYSTEMS, MAN & CYBERNETICS 286,
287 (2000) (“We . . . define automation as a device or system that accomplishes (partially or fully) 
a function that was previously, or conceivably could be, carried out (partially or fully) by a human 
operator.”); see also Frey & Osborne, supra note 33, at 254 n.1 (“We refer to computerisation as 
job automation by means of computer-controlled equipment.”).
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simply must, in an economic sense, “substitute” for a human in 
performing the task.52
Automation is typically motivated by two interrelated factors: the 
desire to reduce the amount of human labor required to complete a task 
and thus to lower costs, and the desire to achieve performance benefits, 
such as superior speed, accuracy, or quality, that may or may not be 
within the capacity of human beings.53 For example, Oracle54 is currently 
marketing what it calls an “Autonomous” or “Self-Driving” Database.
This is essentially a software program that permits collecting, managing, 
and updating a set of information without human involvement.55 As of 
this writing, the advertisement is currently running on the front page of 
the print edition of The Wall Street Journal.56
The express purpose of the Self-Driving Database is both to 
drastically lower the costs of human labor (by half, to be precise), and to 
obtain performance benefits such as greater reliability and improved 
security.57 This is a labor-displacing, not just a labor-saving, innovation,
because it is performing work that would otherwise be done by paid 
human employees. If successful, this innovation will encroach on jobs 
that humans would otherwise have. 
As discussed in the next Parts, the impact of automation on the human 
workforce is a subject of considerable debate. However, several recent 
empirical studies purport to find that many types of automation will 
negatively impact the jobs and wages of at least some people. Scholars at 
the Oxford Martin School at the University of Oxford estimate that forty-
                                                                                                                     
52. Jack M. Balkin, The Three Laws of Robotics in the Age of Big Data, 78 OHIO ST. L.J.
1217, 1224 (2017) (“[R]obots, AI agents, and algorithms substitute for human beings, and operate 
as special purpose people.”).
53. MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., A FUTURE THAT WORKS: AUTOMATION, EMPLOYMENT, AND 
PRODUCTIVITY 11 (2017), https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Featured%20Insights/
Digital%20Disruption/Harnessing%20automation%20for%20a%20future%20that%20works/M
GI-A-future-that-works_Full-report.ashx [https://perma.cc/32E6-EVM2] (“The deployment of 
automation technologies [can] bring a range of performance benefits for companies. . . . They 
include, but are not limited to, greater throughput, higher quality, improved safety, reduced 
variability, a reduction of waste, and higher customer satisfaction.”).
54. Oracle is one of the most profitable software companies in the world, based in Redwood 
Shores, California. See generally Oracle Fact Sheet: Create Tomorrow, Today, ORACLE 
(Oct. 2018), http://www.oracle.com/us/corporate/oracle-fact-sheet-079219.pdf [https://perma.cc/
R9VL-LC9A] (explaining how Oracle has embedded innovative technologies into its cloud).
55. See The World’s #1 Database Is Now the World’s First Self-Driving Database, ORACLE,
https://www.oracle.com/database/autonomous-database/feature.html [https://perma.cc/RG85-
73SM] (“Oracle Autonomous Database Cloud offers total automation based on machine learning 
and eliminates human labor, human error, and manual tuning.”).
56. See, e.g., Oracle, Advertisement, World’s First “Self-Driving” Database, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 16, 2017, at A1. 
57. Id.
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seven percent of U.S. occupations “are potentially automatable over some 
unspecified number of years, perhaps a decade or two.”58 The Oxford 
Martin study finds that the jobs most likely to be automated include 
cashiers, order clerks, tellers, tax preparers, cargo and freight agents, 
watch repairers, title examiners, and telemarketers.59 The safest jobs 
include (to name a sampling from the top twenty) recreational therapists, 
mental health and substance abuse workers, computer systems analysts, 
and anthropologists.60
A McKinsey Global Institute report provides a more conservative 
assessment, predicting that although few entire occupations will be 
replaced in the near future,61 automation will “affect almost all 
occupations . . . to a greater or lesser degree.”62 The report concludes, 
strikingly, that “as a rule of thumb, about 60 percent of all occupations 
have at least 30 percent of activities that are technically automatable.”63
Obviously, “technically automatable” is not the same as “will be 
automated.” The report states that a variety of factors go into a business’s 
decision to automate a particular task: (1) technical feasibility; (2) 
commercial feasibility; (3) supply and cost of human labor alternatives;64
(4) performance and cost benefits associated with using machines; and 
(5) regulatory hurdles or social inhibitions.65 Thus, just because a labor-
displacing solution is technically possible does not mean businesses will 
choose to adopt it. Countervailing considerations, including the
                                                                                                                     
58. Frey & Osborne, supra note 33, at 265; see also CITI GPS, TECHNOLOGY AT WORK V2.0:
THE FUTURE IS NOT WHAT IT USED TO BE 7 (2016) http://www.oxfordmartin.ox.ac.uk/ 
downloads/reports/Citi_GPS_Technology_Work_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/F62W-FFFZ] (“47% of 
US jobs [are] at risk of computerization.”); Sarah Nassauer, Robots Are Replacing Workers Where 
You Shop, WALL ST. J. (July 19, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/robots-are-replacing-
workers-where-you-shop-1500456602 [https://perma.cc/Z4LL-YSVN] (discussing results of 
Citi/Oxford study).  
59. Frey & Osborne, supra note 33, at 278; see also Mark Whitehouse & Dorothy Gambrell, 
How Screwed Is Your Job?, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, June 26, 2017, at 50, 52–53 
(summarizing Frey and Osborne’s data).
60. Frey & Osborne, supra note 33, at 269.
61. MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., supra note 53, at 1 (“Given currently demonstrated 
technologies, very few occupations—less than 5 percent—are candidates for full automation 
today, meaning that every activity constituting these occupations is automated.”).  
62. Id. at 32.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 10 (noting that an important factor is “[t]he quality (for instance, skills), quantity, 
as well as supply, demand, and costs of human labor as an alternative affect which activities will 
be automated”).
65. Id. at 10–12.
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availability of cheap human labor, reluctance to fire people, and concerns 
about reputational harm, can sway businesses in the other direction.66
B. Technological Employment
In light of how much automation we see occurring around us, it is 
tempting to predict that technology will inevitably spell the “end of 
work.”67 Yet even notorious labor-displacing innovations, from the 
spinning loom to the computer, did not eliminate all or even most jobs.68
To the contrary, numerous economists have documented that most labor-
displacing innovations end up creating more work than they destroy.69
The reason for this is the phenomenon of technological employment. A 
review of the economics literature reveals two main mechanisms by 
which technological employment is theorized to occur.
1.  Job Generation 
The first mechanism of technological employment is “job
generation.” Job generation refers to an innovation creating new jobs—
or, to put it more technically, generating new demand for people with 
certain skills.70 Pure job generation is like alchemy, creating jobs where 
there previously were none. The simplest example is the invention of a 
totally new product (say, a more effective means of anesthesia) for which 
people are willing to pay. This drives demand for workers with the skills 
necessary to make and distribute the product to consumers.71 Job 
                                                                                                                     
66. See id. at 10. The farming industry provides a compelling example of this fact. For some 
crops, the availability of cheap labor, not technological feasibility, is the major determinant of 
whether growers use machines at harvest or people. See, e.g., Binyamin Applebaum, Fewer 
Immigrants Mean More Jobs? Not So, Economists Say, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/03/us/politics/legal-immigration-jobs-economy.html
[https://perma.cc/AL24-HF8R].
67. See RIFKIN, supra note 31, at 8–9 (predicting the end or near-end of manual labor in 
factories within the “next twenty to thirty years”).
68. Autor, supra note 35, at 4 (“Clearly, the past two centuries of automation and 
technological progress have not made human labor obsolete . . . .”).
69. See id. (“[T]he employment to population ratio rose during the 20th century even as 
women moved from home to market; and although the unemployment rate fluctuates cyclically, 
there is no apparent long-run increase.”).
70. “Job” refers to a bundle of tasks performed by people with similar sets of skills. Bessen, 
supra note 50, at 9–10 (defining an occupation as a bundle of tasks that can be performed by 
people with similar skills and observing that tasks can be transferred from one occupation to 
another); see also CLAUDIA GOLDIN & LAWRENCE KATZ, THE RACE BETWEEN EDUCATION AND 
TECHNOLOGY 176–79 (2008) (discussing availability of new jobs as a result of inventions that 
permitted automation of some types of work like cash registers and tractors).  
71. See Vincent Van Roy et al., Unit of Econometrics & Applied Statistics, Joint Research 
Centre, Eur. Comm’n, JRC Technical Report: Innovation and Employment in Patenting Firms: 
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generation is also thought to have what economist Enrico Moretti calls a 
“multiplier effect.”72 When people have jobs, they spend more money 
elsewhere in the economy, such as in the services sector—which in turn 
drives demand and job generation in businesses like hair salons and 
restaurants.73
Things get more complicated when the innovation itself is labor-
displacing (say, a robot that administers anesthesia more efficiently than 
humans).74 But even here there can still be job generation due to the fact 
that innovations tend to create “substitute” jobs to replace those they 
eliminate.75 For example, the invention of the tractor reduced the need for 
people to manually plow fields, but tractors also generated new demand 
for people with the skills necessary to manufacture, maintain, and operate 
tractors.76 As explained in the next Part, the job generation argument 
becomes more tenuous the better machines become at performing human 
tasks without assistance. For instance, Oracle founder Larry Ellison
claims that Oracle’s Automated Database can “automatically provision, 
patch, tune and back-up itself, with no human intervention.”77 But in 
theory, any new invention creates at least the possibility for new human 
tasks.
                                                                                                                     
Empirical Evidence from Europe, Rep. EUR 27377, at 3 (2015) (“[T]here is less debate about the 
positive employment effect of product innovations.”).   
72. ENRICO MORETTI, THE NEW GEOGRAPHY OF JOBS 55–63 (2012) (discussing the 
“multiplier effect” associated with technology sector jobs).   
73. See, e.g., David Autor & Anna Salomons, Robocalypse Now—Does Productivity 
Growth Threaten Employment?, 2017 ECB F. ON CENT. BANKING 45, 50, https://docplayer.net/
56822268-Investment-and-growth-in-advanced-economies.html [https://perma.cc/3LSH-X3HT]
(“These spillovers are sufficiently large that they more than offset employment losses in industries 
making rapid productivity gains.”).
74. See, e.g., BESSEN, supra note 24, at 107–09 (discussing anticipated impact of ATM 
machines on bank tellers).
75. See, e.g., James Bessen, Don’t Blame Technology for Persistent Unemployment, SLATE
(Sept. 30, 2013, 3:31 PM), https://slate.com/technology/2013/09/technology-isn-t-taking-all-of-
our-jobs.html [https://perma.cc/L6YB-765Y] (arguing that even if an innovation reduces jobs in 
one industry, it can offset these losses by generating “job growth in different occupations or 
industry segments”); Claire Cain Miller, The Long-Term Jobs Killer Is Not China. It’s 
Automation, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/21/upshot/the-long-
term-jobs-killer-is-not-china-its-automation.html [https://perma.cc/6PCV-VG6J] (“Over time, 
automation has generally had a happy ending: As it has displaced jobs, it has created new ones.”).
76. See Derek Thompson, How the Tractor (Yes, the Tractor) Explains the Middle Class 
Crisis, ATLANTIC (Mar. 13, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/03/how-
the-tractor-yes-the-tractor-explains-the-middle-class-crisis/254270/ [https://perma.cc/ET38-DXHS].
77. Rebecca Hill, Oracle Promises ‘Highly Automated’ Security in Self-Driving Database,
REGISTER (Oct. 2, 2017, 3:53 AM), https://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/10/02/oracle_openworld_
2017_larry_ellison_keynote_day_one/ [https://perma.cc/8NHU-4S5Z] (emphasis added).
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2.  Demand-Boosting
The second mechanism of technological employment is what this 
Article calls “demand-boosting.”78 Demand-boosting predicts that hiring 
within a given occupation or industry will increase as a result of labor-
saving innovations that increase productivity (that is, permit more output 
at lower cost).79 As prices fall, consumption and demand for the products 
increase, and demand for workers rises accordingly.80 For example, if 
tractors lower the price of food like tomatoes and wheat, this means 
consumers will buy more of that food. This increases demand for food 
and for any people whose skills are necessary to plant, grow, harvest, and 
distribute the food.81
Several commentators cite to demand-boosting in order to overcome 
fears that automation threatens the future of human work.82 But does 
demand-boosting really work? To test the theory, economist James 
Bessen performed a case study of the automated teller machine (ATM).83
One might think ATMs would have eliminated the jobs of bank tellers.84
But Bessen found that, even though the ATM “took over cash handling 
tasks” and reduced work for human tellers, “the number of fulltime 
equivalent bank tellers has grown since ATMs were widely deployed 
during the late 1990s and early 2000s.”85 Bessen’s explanation is that “the 
ATM allowed banks to operate branch offices at lower cost,” which 
                                                                                                                     
78. GREENHALGH & ROGERS, supra note 42, at 268–69. Another term sometimes used is the 
“compensation theory.” Van Roy et al., supra note 71, at 2 (“[T]he so-called ‘compensation 
theory’. . . puts forward the view that process innovations lead to more efficient production and 
thus, assuming competitive markets, increasing demand and hence employment.”). 
79. GREENHALGH & ROGERS, supra note 42, at 268–69. 
80. James Bessen, AI and Jobs: The Role of Demand 3 (Boston Univ. Sch. of Law & Econ.,
Research Paper No. 17-46, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3078715
[https://perma.cc/XTB3-XWZY] (“If demand increases sufficiently, employment will grow even 
though the labor required per unit of output declines.”).
81. Demand-boosting usually occurs in conjunction with job generation. Demand for a 
company’s output rises in response to increasing productivity and falling prices, and new or 
substitute jobs then emerge that need to be filled in order to meet that new demand. See the 
discussion in Bessen, supra note 50, at 2–3.
82. See, e.g., Michael Jones, Yes, the Robots Will Steal Our Jobs. And That’s Fine. Those 
Jobs Will Be Replaced with New Ones, WASH. POST (Feb. 17, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/02/17/yes-the-robots-will-steal-our-
jobs-and-thats-fine/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.68d28e52a89c [https://perma.cc/C2FX-S8R8]; 
Jerry Kaplan, Don’t Fear the Robots, WALL ST. J. (July 21, 2017, 10:17 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/dont-fear-the-robots-1500646623 [https://perma.cc/KS5Y-XPB2].
83. Bessen, supra note 50, at 5.
84. BESSEN, supra note 24, at 105.
85. Bessen, supra note 50, at 5 (“Indeed, since 2000, the number of fulltime equivalent 
bank tellers has increased . . . substantially faster than the entire labor force.”).
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lowered the prices of, and increased demand for, banking services.86 This 
in turn “prompted [banks] to open many more branches” to meet the new 
demand, and led to hiring of bank tellers along with other related 
professionals, such as people who were needed to install and fix ATM 
machines.87 This demand-boosting effect, Bessen concludes, “offset[] the 
erstwhile loss in teller jobs.”88
C. Technological Unemployment  
In light of the theories presented in the last Part, why would anyone 
worry about technological unemployment? As explained, technological 
unemployment is defined as job loss brought about by technological 
change.89 But as is clear by now, technological change also creates new 
jobs. If economic historians like Bessen and David Autor are right, in the 
past, innovation has created more jobs than it has destroyed.90
And yet, some people are worried about technological unemployment. 
Respected public commentators, such as former Treasury Secretary 
Lawrence Summers,91 have begun to cast doubt on whether what 
happened in the past will hold true in the future.92 Based on a 
                                                                                                                     
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.; see also BESSEN, supra note 24, at 105–09 (illustrating how the current narrative 
that machines replace labor and reduce employment and wages is “too simplistic”).
89. See the definition in Mokyr et al., supra note 31.
90. See, e.g., Autor & Salomons, supra note 73, at 49 (“Over the 35+ years of data explored 
here, we find that productivity growth has been employment-augmenting rather than employment-
reducing; that is, it has not threatened employment.”).
91. Lawrence H. Summers, Harvard Univ., Keynote Address at Conference: Making Sense 
of the Productivity Slowdown: Reflections on the Productivity Slowdown 16–17 (Nov. 16, 2015),
https://piie.com/sites/default/files/publications/papers/transcript-20151116keynote.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BP4J-FBUR]; see also Eduardo Porter, Jobs Threatened by Machines: A Once 
‘Stupid’ Concern Gains Respect, N.Y. TIMES (June 7, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/
06/08/business/economy/threatened-by-machines-a-once-stupid-concern-gains-respect.html
[https://perma.cc/5VGX-XGND] (discussing current debates among economists regarding “end 
of work”).
92. For just a sampling of recent media articles expressing anxiety about technological 
unemployment, see, for example, Robert C. Allen, Lessons from History for the Future of Work,
550 NATURE 321, 321–24 (2017), https://www.nature.com/polopoly_fs/1.22825!/menu/main/
topColumns/topLeftColumn/pdf/550321a.pdf [https://perma.cc/QMV4-D9T2]; Rachel Abrams 
& Robert Gebeloff, Another Blow for a Battered Work Force: E-Commerce Causes Retail Jobs 
to Dry Up in Old Steel Towns, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2017, at A1; Special Report, The Impact on 
Jobs: Automation and Anxiety: Will Smarter Machines Cause Mass Unemployment?, ECONOMIST
(June 25, 2016), http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21700758-will-smarter-
machines-cause-mass-unemployment-automation-and-anxiety [https://perma.cc/CL3S-3ZXQ]; 
Nida Najar, Indian Technology Workers Worry About a Job Threat: Technology, N.Y. TIMES
(June 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/25/business/india-outsourcing-layoffs-
automation-artificial-intelligence.html [https://perma.cc/B247-EFYQ]; see also, e.g.,
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comprehensive review of this literature, this Part identifies five distinct 
reasons people like Summers are worried. These are, in a sense, five 
distinct attributes of modern technological unemployment that may 
differentiate today’s results from what happened in the past.
1.  Increasing Quality and Pace of Automation
First, commentators in the fields of economics, public policy, and 
journalism opine that machine capabilities are increasingly encroaching 
on the whole gamut of human skills.93 For technological employment via 
job generation and demand-boosting to work, there must be tasks left for 
humans to do. But if machines can do everything, it does not matter how 
many new tasks are generated or how much demand rises. Machines, not 
humans, would be the workforce of the future. 
Robots (machines that resemble humans) are now capable of 
performing a range of classic human functions, from driving vehicles,94
to preparing food,95 to milling steel,96 to testing electronic devices.97
                                                                                                                     
BRYNJOLFSSON & MCAFEE, supra note 28, at 2–9 (discussing this phenomenon); FORD, supra note 
31, at xii (“[M]achines themselves are turning into workers, and the line between the capability 
of labor and capital is blurring as never before.”).
93. See BRYNJOLFSSON & MCAFEE, supra note 28, at 9 (“The pace and scale of this 
encroachment into human skills is relatively recent and has profound economic implications.”); 
ERIK BRYNJOLFSSON & ANDREW MCAFEE, THE SECOND MACHINE AGE: WORK, PROGRESS, AND 
PROSPERITY IN A TIME OF BRILLIANT TECHNOLOGIES 11 (2014) (“[C]omputers, robots, and other 
digital technologies are acquiring [ordinary human] skills and abilities at an extraordinary rate.”);
see also ALEC ROSS, THE INDUSTRIES OF THE FUTURE 27 (2016) (“[T]he current moment in the 
field of robotics is very much like where the world stood with the Internet 20 years ago.”); Steve 
Lohr, A.I. Will Transform the Economy. But How Much, and How Soon?, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/30/technology/ai-will-transform-the-economy-but-
how-much-and-how-soon.html [https://perma.cc/5P35-NC8L] (“[AI] can probably do less right 
now than you think. But it will eventually do more than you probably think, in more places than 
you probably think, and will probably evolve faster than powerful technologies have in the past.”);
WEST, supra note 34, at 2 (discussing technology’s growing capabilities in various fields). 
94. See infra Part II.C.4
95. See Melia Robinson, This Robot-Powered Restaurant Could Put Fast Food Workers 
out of a Job, BUS. INSIDER (June 30, 2016, 5:17 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/ 
momentum-machines-is-hiring-2016-6 [https://perma.cc/M62V-R6TM].
96. See Thomas Biesheuvel, How Just 14 People Make 500,000 Tons of Steel a Year in 
Austria, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (June 21, 2017, 12:01 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2017-06-21/how-just-14-people-make-500-000-tons-of-steel-a-year-in-austria
(describing a nearly deserted steel mill except for “three technicians who sit high above the line, 
monitoring output on a bank of flatscreens”).  
97. See, e.g., Complaint for Violation of Uniform Trade Secrets Act, Breach of Contract, 
Interference with Business Expectancy, and Violation of Washington Consumer Act at 1–3, T-
Mobile USA, Inc. v. Huawei Device USA, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 3d 1184 (W.D. Wash. 2014) (No. 
2:14-cv-01351) (asserting T-Mobile’s custom-built phone-testing robot, “Tappy,” was part of a 
trade secret dispute after workers at Huawei stole Tappy’s mechanical finger).
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Drones—or “unmanned aerial vehicles”98—can perform a wide range of 
jobs formerly or still performed by humans: package delivery,99 going to 
war,100 crop-dusting,101 disaster aide,102 and insurance claims 
inspection.103 The most influential form of automation consists simply of 
implementing algorithms on general purpose computers.104 Quantifying 
algorithms’ use in the economy is virtually impossible because 
algorithms are used in secret, with little transparency as to their function 
and capabilities.105 Computer algorithms permit near-total automation of 
a variety of tasks, such as internet searching,106 data collection and 
analysis,107 stock picking,108 and designing investment strategies.109 One 
                                                                                                                     
98. See generally Margot E. Kaminski, Drone Federalism: Civilian Drones and the Things 
They Carry, 4 CALIF. L. REV. CIR. 57, 57 (2013) (discussing drones and their related privacy 
issues).
99. Elizabeth Weise, Amazon Delivered Its First Customer Package by Drone, USA TODAY
(Dec. 14, 2016, 9:37 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2016/12/14/amazon-
delivered-its-first-customer-package-drone/95401366/ [https://perma.cc/H8R3-T5EN].
100. But see Rebecca Crootof, The Killer Robots Are Here: Legal and Policy Implications,
36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1837, 1842 (2015) (exploring legal implications of autonomous weapons 
systems, including unclear liability). See generally John Yoo, Embracing the Machines: 
Rationalist War and New Weapons Technologies, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 443 (2017) (describing 
modern applications for robotics in warfare).
101. See SPRAYING DRONE, http://sprayingdrone.com [https://perma.cc/NM34-GVYM]
(marketing “Spraying Drone” brand crop dusters).
102. See, e.g., Associated Press, Drones to the Rescue, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/19/health/drones-by-air.html [https://perma.cc/QY98-UAUG]
(reporting ambulance drones are used to rapidly deliver defibrillators to people in cardiac arrest).
103. Nicole Friedman, That Drone Hovering Over Your Home? It’s the Insurance Inspector,
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 4, 2017, 5:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/that-drone-hovering-over-
your-home-its-the-insurance-inspector-1501839002 [https://perma.cc/T73W-4Y73].
104. See, e.g., WEST, supra note 34, at 4. 
105. See FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT 
CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION 6 (2015).
106. Barry Schwartz, How Google Uses Machine Learning in its Search Algorithms, SEARCH 
ENGINE LAND (Oct. 18, 2016, 10:40 AM), https://searchengineland.com/google-uses-machine-
learning-search-algorithms-261158 [https://perma.cc/VQA6-L9AL] (discussing Google’s use of 
search algorithms to improve internet searching, both with and without human assistance).
107. Oracle Autonomous Database: Think Autonomous, ORACLE, https://www.oracle.com/ 
database/autonomous-database/feature.htmland [https://perma.cc/Q5HR-2W9Q] (explaining the 
aforementioned Oracle Autonomous Database, claiming superiority over human-based
alternatives).
108. Bailey McCann, The Artificial-Intelligent Investor: AI Funds Beckon, WALL ST. J.
(Nov. 5, 2017, 10:07 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-artificial-intelligent-investor-ai-
funds-beckon-1509937622 [https://perma.cc/8MUL-5JCU].
109. Hugh Son, Your Robo-Advisor May Have a Conflict of Interest, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (July 27, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-07-
27/your-robo-adviser-may-have-a-conflict-of-interest [https://perma.cc/Q2CT-T2RM].
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program, called “Woebot” even provides mental therapy (albeit probably 
not very well).110
The more disturbing piece of this story is the accelerating pace of
these improvements. For example, commentators are not alarmed by the 
simple fact that self-driving cars are being developed and 
commercialized, but that this is happening so quickly.111 A major 
potential driver of this uptick in pace is “machine learning.”112 Machine 
learning outsources the process of automation to machines, putting
machines in charge of automating complex, labor-intensive processes 
without significant human involvement, and with greater speed and 
accuracy than humans could ever achieve.113 As Professors Erik 
Brynjolfsson and Tom Mitchell put it, machine learning permits 
“automating automation.”114
Besides contributing to the increasing pace of improvements in 
automation, machine learning may alter the landscape of invention itself.
If machines are now capable of generating patentable inventions, this 
means inventors are no longer always human.115 This, too, has the 
potential to exacerbate technological unemployment. As explained
further in Part II, intellectual property-generating companies like Google 
and Tesla are a big part of today’s technological employment story. They 
are responsible for creating jobs with comparatively high wages for
engineers and scientists capable of obtaining patents and copyrights.116
                                                                                                                     
110. Megan Molteni, The Chatbot Therapist Will See You Now, WIRED (June 7, 2017,
7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2017/06/facebook-messenger-woebot-chatbot-therapist/
[https://perma.cc/TU57-QA5K].
111. See, e.g., Tim Higgins, Driverless-Car Companies Try to Rev Their Engines on 
Commercial Prospects, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 8, 2018, 3:55 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
driverless-car-companies-try-to-rev-their-engines-on-commercial-prospects-1515416403
[https://perma.cc/HQ6X-PXL8].
112. Erik Brynjolfsson & Tom Mitchell, What Can Machine Learning Do? Workforce 
Implications, 358 SCIENCE 1530, 1530 (2017).
113. Id. at 1531.
114. See id.; see also Byron Spice, Machine Learning Will Change Jobs, CARNEGIE MELLON 
UNIV. (Dec. 21, 2017), https://www.cmu.edu/news/stories/archives/2017/december/machine-
learning-study.html [https://perma.cc/8SSW-3KEE] (providing commentary by the source’s 
author about effects of automation in future job markets and examples of what job types would 
not be a good fit for automation).
115. See generally Ryan Abbott, I Think, Therefore I Invent: Creative Computers and the 
Future of Patent Law, 57 B.C. L. REV., 1079, 1079–80, 1083–84 (2016) (recounting the 
emergence of creative AI’s relationship with the Patent Office and AI’s proven abilities to 
independently create new, innovative works).
116. Google is considered one of the top places to work in the country. Rachel Gillett, The 
50 Best Places to Work in 2018, According to Employees, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 6, 2017, 8:51 AM), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/best-places-to-work-2018-2017-12#5-google-46 [https://perma.cc/
695A-892D]. It employs around 88,110 employees. Number of Full-Time Alphabet Employees 
from 2007 to 2017, STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/273744/ number-of-full-time-
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But, if machines are the inventors of the future, then these drivers of high-
wage employment would go away too.
2.  Limits to Demand as a Driver of Technological Employment
Demand-boosting relies on the idea that more productivity leads to 
lower prices, which leads to more consumption, which leads to more 
hiring. But the demand-boosting mechanism has inherent limits—which
some worry may be reached in the not too distant future.117
First, consumers’ demand for products and services itself has limits. 
As Professor Bessen has discussed, the degree to which automation will 
boost employment depends on how much a decrease in price actually 
enhances consumers’ demand for an output.118 Although this mechanism 
works when consumers respond to decreases in price by buying more of 
the output (that is, prices for the output are elastic), it does not work as 
well in more satiated markets like food or clothing, where decreasing the 
price does not lead people to buy more because they already have enough 
(that is, prices are inelastic).119 In some industries, there could be a point 
at which demand and hiring begin to flatten out, despite falling prices due 
to automation.120
A second, related downward push on demand-boosting comes from 
the fact that “robots don’t consume.”121 Demand-boosting implicitly 
relies on human consumers to drive demand outputs. But, if more human 
jobs become automated, workers will be robots, not humans, and there 
will be fewer and fewer humans earning disposable income to spend and
drive demand and further hiring.122
                                                                                                                     
google-employees/ [https://perma.cc/KE2Z-5WKJ]. For more details on the prospects of IP-
generators, see Part III.C.
117. Rifkin explains that adherence to the “trickle down technology argument” (what this 
Article refers to as “demand-boosting”) has revealed the theory does not hold up when put to the 
test. RIFKIN, supra note 31, at 15. “[T]he conventional economic wisdom has been that new 
technologies boost productivity, lower the costs of production, and increase the supply of cheap 
goods, which, in turn, stimulates purchasing power, expands markets, and generates more 
jobs. . . . Its logic is now leading to unprecedented levels of . . . unemployment, a precipitous 
decline in consumer purchasing power, and the specter of a worldwide depression of incalculable 
magnitude and duration.” Id.
118. Bessen, supra note 50, at 2–3
119. Id. at 5–6.
120. Id. at 15; see also RIFKIN, supra note 31, at 7 (describing how certain industries and 
position types are particularly vulnerable to employment loss); Autor, supra note 35, at 7 
(discussing the limits to demand as the driver of employment); Brynjolfsson & Mitchell, supra
note 112, at 1533 (noting that automation’s impact on employment depends in part on the “price 
elasticity” of demand).
121. See, e.g., FORD, supra note 31, at 196–97.
122. See, e.g., id. at 197; see also Brynjolfsson & Mitchell, supra note 112, at 1534 
(“Automation may change the total income for some individuals or the broader population . . . 
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A final barrier to demand-boosting is that not all markets will see a 
decrease in prices just because costs go down. As Bessen notes, a crucial 
assumption behind demand-boosting is that markets are competitive, not 
monopolistic.123 If barriers to entry—for example, intellectual property—
prevent competition from driving down prices, this would hinder 
demand-boosting still further.124 Imagine that the use of intellectual 
property had permitted companies to keep prices high and to restrict 
output during the Industrial Revolution, when automated looms lowered 
costs and increased demand for items like clothing. Maybe the clothing 
industry would not have expanded as much and hiring would not have 
risen.125
3.  Decreasing Quality of Remaining Human Work
Some commentators are skeptical of these fears. They contend that we 
should have faith that innovation will create new jobs we cannot yet 
imagine.126 But modern technological unemployment is not just about 
technology’s impact on the overall quantity of jobs. It’s about 
technology’s impact on the quality of jobs.
Technological change can either augment or diminish human work.127
Augmentation, on its own, is a very good thing. Workers become more 
productive and their performance is enhanced, sometimes to superhuman 
                                                                                                                     
[and thus] change demand for some types of goods and the derived demand for the tasks needed 
to produce those goods.”).
123. See, e.g., Bessen, supra note 50 (“If we assume that rapid productivity growth generated 
rapid price declines in competitive product markets, then these price declines would be a major 
source of demand growth.” (emphasis added)).
124. See Lemley, supra note 14, at 497–99 (arguing intellectual property may be used to 
artificially preserve monopolies as the costs of production fall).
125. For what actually happened, see BESSEN, supra note 24, at 97 (“With progressively 
lower costs, prices fell, consumers demanded more cotton cloth per capita, and there was more 
demand for weavers.”).
126. See Lemley, supra note 14, at 512–15 (opining that, even in a world where people are 
no longer needed to produce goods and services, people will have new jobs to do); Daniel Hemel,
Bringing the Basic Income Back to Earth, NEW RAMBLER REV. (Sept. 19, 2016), 
http://newramblerreview.com/book-reviews/economics/bringing-the-basic-income-back-to-
earth#.V-RzhtMTcdc.twitter [https://perma.cc/GC4B-3M84] (reviewing ANDY STERN & LEE 
KRAVITZ, RAISING THE FLOOR: HOW A UNIVERSAL BASIC INCOME CAN RENEW OUR ECONOMY AND 
REBUILD THE AMERICAN DREAM (2016) and CHARLES MURRAY, IN OUR HANDS: A PLAN TO 
REPLACE THE WELFARE STATE (Revised & Updated ed., 2016)) (“[A]dvances in artificial 
intelligence will lead to some job losses in the coming years. But these advances will also lead to 
new jobs . . . .”); see also Kaplan, supra note 82 (casting doubt on the ability of machines to 
perform many essential tasks in today’s economy).
127. See, e.g., Brynjolfsson & Mitchell, supra note 112, at 1531 (explaining that machine 
learning can make certain jobs less valuable and others more valuable as it “augment[s] human 
capabilities”).
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levels.128 Several major professions are augmented by machines.
Affected professionals include, to name a few, mechanical engineers, 
chief executive officers, and microbiologists—all of whom stand to 
benefit from technologies that complement, rather than replace, their skill 
sets.129 One extreme example is the “quants” who manipulate electronic 
trading algorithms to achieve much higher returns than ordinary traders 
and analysts.130 Another example is certain doctors, who use artificial 
intelligence to make more accurate diagnoses or perform surgery.131
Some lawyers, too, benefit immensely from technology that facilitates 
case law research.132
Diminution, on the other hand, occurs when technology substantially 
reduces demand for workers’ skills, and reduces their wages 
accordingly.133 Even when technology does not wipe out someone’s 
profession, it can turn them into, basically, an automaton, there mainly to 
“fill in gaps” left over by machines.134 The manufacturing sector provides 
some depressing examples. A recent New Yorker article, for instance, 
describes the workplace of a large manufacturer of office furniture that 
                                                                                                                     
128. The notion that technology will augment some professions, but not others, is the thesis 
of several recent books. See, e.g., THOMAS DAVENPORT & JULIA KIRBY, ONLY HUMANS NEED 
APPLY: WINNERS AND LOSERS IN THE AGE OF SMART MACHINES 65–66 (2016); see also Jeanne 
Meister, Future of Work: Three Ways to Prepare for the Impact of Intelligent Technologies in
Your Workplace, FORBES (July 6, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jeannemeister/2016/
07/06/future-of-work-three-ways-to-prepare-for-the-impact-of-intelligent-technologies-in-your-
workplace/ [https://perma.cc/E3TJ-3M9V] (discussing how “intelligent technologies” will 
enhance workplace productivity).
129. Frey & Osborne, supra note 33, app. A tbl. at 270.
130. Gregory Zuckerman & Bradley Hope, The Quants Run Wall Street Now, WALL ST. J.
(May 21, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-quants-run-wall-street-now-1495389108
[https://perma.cc/4JTM-6TGA].
131. Tom Sullivan, Cognitive Computing Will Democratize Medicine, IBM Watson Officials 
Say, HEALTHCARE IT NEWS (Apr. 27, 2017, 4:20 PM), https://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/
cognitive-computing-will-democratize-medicine-ibm-watson-officials-say [https://perma.cc/
RQH2-KKFJ] (“Artificial intelligence tools will augment physicians’ jobs . . . .”); see also Tim 
O’Reilly, Don’t Replace People. Augment Them, MEDIUM (July 17, 2016),
https://www.oreilly.com/ideas/dont-replace-people-augment-them [https://perma.cc/5A5B-
XXZE] (“My eyes were fixed by an augmented surgeon able to do something that had been 
previously impossible.”).
132. See Karen Turner, Meet ‘Ross,’ the Newly Hired Legal Robot, WASH. POST (May 16, 
2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/innovations/wp/2016/05/16/meet-ross-the-newly-
hired-legal-robot/ [https://perma.cc/8SZQ-V8VA]; see also ROSS INTELLIGENCE, http://www.ross 
intelligence.com [https://perma.cc/HJR2-PZRN] (providing an example of legal research 
technological advancements).
133. See e.g., FORD, supra note 31, at 3.
134. See, e.g., Brynjolfsson & Mitchell, supra note 112, at 1531; see also FORD, supra note 
31, at 3 (concluding that human job quality is decreasing due to such technology). 
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introduced computerized work stations and computer-assisted arms.135
Sometimes called “meat robots” by their own peers, employees now 
“follow a strict automated protocol,” for which they “need little 
training.”136 “Even the drill [used to affix parts of furniture being 
assembled] [is] attached to a computer-assisted arm; the worker just [has] 
to move it to the right position and let the machine do its magic.”137 A
decade ago, the article concludes, “industrial robots assisted workers in 
their tasks. Now workers—those who remain—assist the robots in 
theirs.”138
Diminution can happen to high-skill as well as low-skill jobs. For 
example, translating languages was once the sole domain of skilled 
human translators.139 But thanks to improving translation technologies, 
“[i]t is much easier for machines (and humans) to translate between 
closely related languages.”140 Humans are not fully replaced because 
some translations are too complex or context-specific for machines to do 
alone.141 However, for many purposes, “Google Translate is faster, 
cheaper, and often as good as a human interpreter.”142 Human translators 
are used merely to “clean up” the work of automated translation tools.143
4.  Rising Inequality in Who Has What Jobs
One of the most disturbing pieces of modern technological 
un/employment is that the impact of technology differs drastically for 
different members of society.144 The result is that even if technology 
                                                                                                                     
135. Sheelah Kolhatkar, Welcoming Our New Robot Overlords, NEW YORKER (Oct. 23, 
2017), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/10/23/welcoming-our-new-robot-overlords
[https://perma.cc/ZWB5-84NQ].
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Translation Platforms Cannot Replace Humans: But They are Still Astonishingly 
Useful, ECONOMIST (Apr. 29, 2017), https://www.economist.com/news/books-and-
arts/21721357-they-are-still-astonishingly-useful-translation-platforms-cannot-replace-humans
[https://perma.cc/FJ9P-Z5RD].
140. Id.
141. Id. (“Literature requires far too supple an understanding of the author’s intentions and 
culture for machines to do the job. And for critical work—technical, financial or legal, say—small 
mistakes (of which even the best systems still produce plenty) are unacceptable . . . .”).
142. Greg Ip, We Survived Spreadsheets, and We’ll Survive AI, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 2, 2017, 
11:47 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/wesurvived-spreadsheets-and-well-survive-ai-
1501688765 [https://perma.cc/7KYP-4CCU]. 
143. Why Translators Have the Blues: A Profession Under Pressure, ECONOMIST (May 27, 
2017), https://www.economist.com/news/books-and-arts/21722609-profession-under-pressure-
why-translators-have-blues [https://perma.cc/YT66-D63P].
144. See BRYNJOLFSSON & MCAFEE, supra note 28, at 39 (“Even when technological 
progress increases productivity and overall wealth, it can also affect the division of rewards, 
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creates more new jobs than it destroys on net, these net gains are not 
equally distributed.145
The main disparity comes from the thesis that technological change is 
“skill-biased.”146 According to economics professors Claudia Goldin and 
Lawrence Katz “the central idea . . . is that certain technologies are 
difficult for workers and consumers to master, at least initially.”147
“[E]mployees who are slow to grasp new tools will not be promoted and 
might see their earnings reduced. Those who are quicker will be 
rewarded.”148 The upshot is that “low-skill” workers—generally, people 
with lower levels of formal education—are left behind or made obsolete 
by machines, but “high-skill” workers—people with higher levels of 
formal education—are rewarded.149
In their recent book, Race Against the Machine, economists Erik 
Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee show that this thesis is supported by 
historical data on the correlation between wages and education level.150
“Over the past 40 years,” they write, “weekly wages for those with a high 
school degree have fallen and wages for those with a high school degree 
and some college have stagnated. On the other hand, college-educated 
workers have seen significant gains, with the biggest gains going to those 
who have completed graduate training . . . .”151 Brynjolfsson and McAfee
link this unequal distribution of gains mainly to machines and 
automation, rather than to other trends such as globalization.152
5. Inability of Education to Keep Pace
The fact that technology favors higher-skilled workers would not in 
itself be a problem if everyone had the skills necessary to be a winner.
However, according to Goldin and Katz, education in the United States 
has not kept pace with technological advancement, leaving a gap between 
                                                                                                                     
potentially making some people worse off than they were before the innovation.”). The book 
further explains this issue. Id. at 36–47 (discussing various “winners and losers” ushered in by 
advances in technology).
145. See id. at 39–40.
146. Id. at 39; see also Autor & Salomons, supra note 73, at 48 (discussing how wage loss 
for less educated workers is “typically attributed to skill-biased demand shifts”); GREENHALGH &
ROGERS, supra note 42, at 268 (“[T]he predominant view is that high-skilled workers are 
complementary to high-technology capital and knowledge stocks, while those with lower skills 
are substitutes for capital.”).
147. GOLDIN & KATZ, supra note 70, at 90.
148. Id. Frey and Osborne discuss Goldin and Katz’s large body work in Frey & Osborne, 
supra note 33, at 257.
149. GOLDIN & KATZ, supra note 70, at 94–98.
150. Id. at 94–99.
151. BRYNJOLFSSON & MCAFEE, supra note 28, at 39–40.
152. Id. at 4–9, 39–42. 
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the demand for educated workers and the supply.153 They call this the 
“race between technology and education.”154 The result of technology 
winning the race is a “skills gap”: higher demand for people with a certain 
skill set than there is supply.155
In theory, education could resolve the skills gap and alleviate 
inequality by bringing the unskilled to the level of the skilled. However, 
under Goldin and Katz’s framework, if improvements in automation 
continue at the same or an increasing rate, education may improve too 
slowly to help people gain the skills required to work with future 
technologies. Moreover—returning to the points made above about 
machines’ increasingly impressive range of capabilities and the limits to 
demand as a driver of remaining human employment—even assuming 
perfect education, there simply may not be enough jobs to go around.156
Martin Ford provides a compelling, albeit disturbing, visual depiction of 
this scenario. He depicts the historic job market like a pyramid, with 
many low-skill jobs at the bottom, and only a few high-skill jobs at the 
top.157 “It’s becoming increasingly clear,” Ford writes, that “robots, 
machine learning algorithms, and other forms of automation are gradually 
going to consume much of the base of the jobs skills pyramid.”158 Even 
by investing in “still more education and training,” Ford concludes, it is 
unlikely that we can “cram everyone into that shrinking region at the very 
top.”159 In other words, not only is education not keeping pace with 
technology, but doing so may one day be an impossibility.
II. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AS A DRIVER OF TECHNOLOGICAL
UN/EMPLOYMENT
The consensus of the work discussed above is that innovation both 
eliminates and creates employment and, moreover, that innovation 
significantly affects the quality and distribution of jobs across the 
economy.160 This Part shows that intellectual property plays a role in 
                                                                                                                     
153. GOLDIN & KATZ, supra note 70, at 7–8, 99–102.
154. Id. at 7, 298. 
155. See, e.g., Kristin Majcher, The Hunt for Qualified Workers, MIT TECH. REV.
(Sept. 16, 2014), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/530701/the-hunt-for-qualified-workers/
[https://perma.cc/VNU2-PCVN]. But see Andrew Weaver, The Myth of the Skills Gaps, MIT
TECH. REV. (Aug. 25, 2017), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/608707/the-myth-of-the-
skills-gap/ [https://perma.cc/7936-KEMM] (“[P]ersistent hiring problems are less widespread 
than many pundits and industry representatives claim.”). 
156. FORD, supra note 31, at 252–53 (“The numbers simply don’t work.”).
157. Id. at 252.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 252–53.
160. See supra Part I.
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generating technological un/employment, and it may contribute to these 
trends.
The reader might initially think the presence or absence of intellectual 
property makes no difference for employment at all. This is because 
modern intellectual property rights only provide a right to exclude others 
from using the covered innovation.161 Intellectual property covering a 
particular technology does not give a company the right to use it, let alone 
guarantee they will be successful.162 On the flip side, absent intellectual 
property, companies are free to adopt innovations like drones and self-
driving cars, so long as they do not run afoul of health and safety or other 
regulations.163
This intuition is wrong. The easiest way to see why is to go back in 
time.
A. Privilege Regimes
Unlike today, historically, there was no question intellectual property 
rights could influence employment. The U.S. patent regime has its origins 
in sixteenth century Great Britain, and before that, fifteenth century 
Venice.164 Back then, patents conferred the “privilege” to practice an 
invention in the jurisdiction, without which the inventor could not use his 
invention in the realm.165 Privilege-granting regimes made the decision 
whether to confer a privilege based on a variety of factors besides an 
invention’s novelty—including the invention’s likely “impact on local 
labor, commerce, and prices.”166 Like early corporate charters, “patents 
                                                                                                                     
161. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2012) (“Every patent shall contain . . . a grant to the patentee, 
his heirs or assigns, of the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling 
the invention throughout the United States or importing the invention into the United 
States . . . .”); see also 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012) (“[T]he owner of copyright under this title has the 
exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following . . . .”).
162. See Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 343 (2010) 
(noting that few patents are ever commercialized).   
163. Various regulations external to intellectual property regulate the use of emerging 
technologies. See, e.g., Carla Reyes, Moving Beyond Bitcoin to an Endogenous Theory of 
Decentralized Ledger Technology Regulation: An Initial Proposal, 61 VILL. L. REV. 191, 201
(2016) (discussing ways to regulate Bitcoin and other payments systems that operate using 
“distributed ledger technology”).
164. See ROBERT MERGES & JOHN DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS
3–5 (5th ed. 2011).
165. See Camilla A. Hrdy, State Patent Laws in the Age of Laissez Faire, 28 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 45, 58 (2013); cf. Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What Thomas Jefferson Thought About Patents? 
Reevaluating the Patent “Privilege” in Historical Context, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 953, 957–58
(2007) (casting doubt on the notion that early American patent rights were seen as “privileges” in 
the modern sense of the term).
166. See Mario Biagioli, Patent Republic: Representing Inventions, Constructing Rights and
Authors, 73 SOC. RES. 1129, 1134 (2006); see also Oren Bracha, The Commodification of Patents
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were granted selectively to private developers who promised to furnish 
the state with something that would contribute to economic growth or 
infrastructure.”167
Therefore, if an inventor came to the sovereign seeking a patent to use 
the technology in the region, and that technology was likely to have a 
negative impact on the work force, it was far less likely the sovereign 
would grant that patent. For example, Professor Mario Biagioli has 
recounted the famous inventor Galileo’s efforts to obtain a “privilege” to 
operate his new water pump—in Venice in 1594—based on his
assessment of the pump’s utility in providing an efficient way to pump 
water in “[t]erminally swampy” Venice.168 One wonders whether 
Venetian officials would have granted Galileo the privilege to operate his 
water pump if Galileo had instead insisted his water pump’s main 
advantage would be to reduce employment for Venetian farmers.
There are indeed documented instances of privilege granting regimes 
denying patents for labor-displacing inventions. The Introduction 
mentioned William Lee’s unsuccessful attempt to achieve a patent for his 
knitting machine in England and France, which the Queen of England 
predicted would bring her subjects to “ruin by depriving them of 
employment.”169 Another example comes from Venice, courtesy of 
Professor Stefania Fusco. The petitioner, Maria Bessea Brancaleoni, 
sought a patent for “a machine that could be used to either to spin and 
[sic] wind several kinds of materials.” The officials reviewing her petition 
stated that the invention was “ingenious and beautiful and could easily 
accomplish” what Brancaleoni had promised. However, they warned the 
Signoria (the issuing authority) to be careful, because “if the device 
proved to be effective (as was likely to be the case) it would be to the 
detriment of the poor, because this machine would cause unemployment 
among poor [women].”170
These examples demonstrate that in both England and Venice, at least 
some patents were reviewed specifically for their predicted impact on 
labor and were sometimes denied if found to be to detrimental to workers. 
This changed in early American patent law. As Professor Biagioli and 
others have observed, the U.S. Patent Act of 1790 shifted the focus of 
                                                                                                                     
1600–1836: How Patents Became Rights and Why We Should Care, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 177, 
186–87 (2004) (describing the functionality of tangible benefits offered in patent petitions). 
167. Herbert Hovenkamp, The Emergence of Classical American Patent Law, 58 ARIZ. L.
REV. 263, 267 (2016); see also Hrdy, supra note 165, at 60–64, 95–96, 100–04 (discussing 
consideration of social utility in state patent laws and earlier privilege regimes).
168. Biagioli, supra note 166, at 1132–33.
169. See ACEMOGLU & ROBINSON, supra note 3.
170. This example is courtesy of Professor Stefania Fusco. Professor Fusco’s original 
translation is on file with the author.
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patents from generating local utility in the socioeconomic sense to 
disclosing new information.171 Nonetheless, in the first few decades, 
employment remained a factor that was sometimes raised in discussions 
surrounding patentability—for instance in assessing whether a patent met 
the Patent Act’s “utility” requirement.172 Professor Oren Bracha gives the 
example of Eli Whitney’s patent for his cotton gin, challenged in Whitney 
v. Carter (1810).173 When the cotton gin’s utility was questioned, 
Whitney’s counsel responded by cataloguing the public benefits 
conferred by the cotton gin, including that the cotton gin provided “a 
lucrative employment” for “[i]ndividuals who were depressed with 
poverty” and “sunk in idleness.”174 This example shows not only that 
inventions’ impact on employment was a valid consideration within the 
U.S. patent system, but also that inventions were perceived to lead to 
technological employment as well as unemployment.
B. Modern Intellectual Property
Modern intellectual property rights in the United States are not what 
they were in early privilege regimes. The Patent Act, which is in this 
respect representative of modern American intellectual property regimes, 
no longer supplies the right or permission to practice an invention in the
jurisdiction. Instead, a patent supplies only the “right to exclude others” 
from making, using, selling, or importing the covered invention for the 
lifetime of the patent.175 Thus, denying intellectual property rights for a 
labor-displacing innovation would not create a ban on using or adopting 
the technology; it would just mean the innovator does not get the benefit 
of exclusivity. What is more, today, neither the Patent Office nor courts 
scrutinize the moral or economic implications of inventions when 
deciding whether to grant or uphold intellectual property rights.176
                                                                                                                     
171. See Biagioli, supra note 166, at 1138; see also Camilla Hrdy, State Patents As a Solution 
to Underinvestment in Innovation, 62 U. KAN. L. REV. 487, 493–95 (2013) (discussing the four 
essential features that differentiated state patents from U.S. patents).
172. See Oren Bracha, Owning Ideas: A History of Anglo-American Intellectual Property
99–100 (June 2005) (unpublished S.J.D. thesis, Harvard Law School) (discussing assessment of 
social utility in early nineteenth century patent law).
173. 29 F. Cas. 1070, 1071 (C.C.D. Ga. 1810); see Bracha, supra note 172, at 418–19.
174. See Whitney, 29 F. Cas. at 1072; see Bracha, supra note 172.
175. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2012); see also Kewanee v. Bicron, 416 U.S 470, 480 (1974) (“The 
patent laws promote [the Progress of Science and useful arts] by offering a right of exclusion for 
a limited period as an incentive to inventors to risk the often enormous costs in terms of time, 
research, and development.”).
176. An exception is Justice Joseph Story’s so-called “moral utility” requirement, under 
which an invention cannot be “injurious to the morals, the health, or the good order of society.” 
Bedford v. Hunt, 3 F. Cas. 37, 37 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817). However, the moral utility doctrine has 
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However, standard intellectual property theory suggests intellectual 
property rights still have an impact on both the magnitude and the pace 
of technology’s replacement of human labor. There are four major 
intellectual property regimes: patents,177 copyrights,178 trade secrets,179
and trademarks.180 A primary reason government creates intellectual 
property rights is to help innovators internalize the uncompensated 
benefits their innovations generate for others (called positive externalities 
or spillovers), so that innovators will innovate more than they otherwise 
would and get society closer to the optimal level of innovation.181 More 
specifically, intellectual property is thought to affect incentives to
innovate in two key ways. First, the right to exclude acts as an incentive 
to invent and commercialize a given innovation by making it easier for 
companies to appropriate returns by restricting copying and 
competition.182 Second, the race for priority over a legal right to 
exclude—particularly in patent law where one inventor achieves 
universal priority—is believed to accelerate the pace at which invention
and commercialization occurs.183
To be clear, few would argue that intellectual property is a “but for” 
determinant of whether, or when, an innovation is invented and adopted. 
Rather, intellectual property is viewed as one of several factors that affect 
companies’ decisions, and the extent to which intellectual property does 
so will depend on the form of intellectual property and the context.184
When it comes to the incentive to innovate, the four intellectual property 
regimes operate distinctly; but each is perceived to have an effect. Most 
scholarship focuses specifically on patents’ effects on incentives to invent 
                                                                                                                     
been largely rejected by modern courts. See Sean B. Seymore, Making Patents Useful, 98 MINN.
L. REV. 1046, 1057–59 (2014). 
177. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103, 112 (2012).
178. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–102, 106 (2012).
179. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831–1839 (2012).
180. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1127, 1114, 1125 (2012).
181. R. Polk Wagner, Information Wants to Be Free: Intellectual Property and the 
Mythologies of Control, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 995, 1005, 1009 (2003) (asserting that intellectual 
property serves to preserve incentives to generate new information in the face of inevitable 
spillovers).  
182. See GREENHALGH & ROGERS, supra note 42, at 272 (observing that intellectual property 
rights allow firms to achieve “excess profits that cannot be easily competed away by other firms 
in the short run”).
183. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, The Inducement Standard of 
Patentability, 120 YALE L.J. 1590, 1599 (2011); see also Hrdy, infra note 185, at 32–33
(discussing theories under which patents accelerate the pace of innovation).
184. See, e.g., Stuart J.H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent 
System: Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255, 1255 (2009) 
(surveying entrepreneurs to learn how they perceive patents in various industries).
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and commercialize.185 With respect to copyrights, although most 
copyright subject matter seems divorced from the types of labor-saving 
innovation under discussion, an important subset of copyright subject 
matter has been integral to automation: software.186 Trade secret law only 
provides a right to exclude others who obtain the innovation by improper 
means or in breach of a duty of confidentiality,187 but the principle by 
which trade secrets operate is the same: the right to exclude is presumed 
to provide, among other things, an incentive to innovate.188 Trademark’s 
status as an innovation incentive is the most controversial of the four, 
since trademark law’s primary goal is said to be to protect consumers 
from confusion as to the source of goods and services, and only 
secondarily to give sellers an incentive to invest in product “quality.”189
However, some contend trademarks provide an incentive to innovate 
because trademarks help innovators prevent others from passing off their 
own offerings as those of the true innovator, and in this way retain a first-
mover advantage for their innovations as against potential competitors.190
With respect to each of these intellectual property regimes, the upshot 
is that, when presented with the decision of whether to innovate or not 
innovate, the potential innovator is at least theoretically more likely to 
                                                                                                                     
185. See, e.g., Camilla A. Hrdy, Commercialization Awards, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 13, 27–39; 
Robert P. Merges, Uncertainty and the Standard of Patentability, 7 HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 2–3 (1992); 
Ouellette, supra note 11, at 75–87. 
186. Despite early objections, copyright law protects computer code as “literary works” and 
also protects some functional aspects of software. See generally Pamela Samuelson, The Uneasy 
Case for Software Copyrights Revisited, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1746, 1782 (2011) (discussing 
that copyright protection is deeply entrenched in software protection).
187. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 490 (1974).
188. Id. at 493 (“Trade secret law encourages the development and exploitation of those 
items of lesser or different invention than might be accorded protection under the patent laws . . . 
[and] promotes the sharing of knowledge . . . .”); see also Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating 
the Returns from Industrial Research and Development, 3 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY
783, 783–831 (1987) (providing survey evidence regarding the perceived importance of patents 
and trade secrets as innovation incentives). 
189. Robert Bone, Hunting Goodwill: A History of the Concept of Goodwill in Trademark 
Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 547, 558 (2006); see also Mark McKenna, The Normative Foundations of 
Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 1844–49 (2007) (providing that the goal of 
trademark law is to improve the quality of information in the marketplace and reduce consumer 
search costs).
190. See, e.g., GREENHALGH & ROGERS, supra note 42, at 40 (“The signaling argument for 
trademarks is linked to the basic justification for IPRs: firms would be reluctant to invest in new 
product innovation if the new product could not be distinguished from imitations.”); see also
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. &
ECON. 265, 266 (1987) (discussing trademarks as an incentive to invest in product quality).  I am 
also indebted to ideas presented by Jason S. George & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette in their working 
paper, entitled Trademarks as Innovation Incentives, which they presented at the Intellectual 
Property Scholars Conference at Berkeley Law on August 9, 2018.
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choose to innovate due to the option for intellectual property protection, 
and is likely to do so faster than in a world without intellectual property
protection.
C. Intellectual Property’s Impact on Technological Un/employment
For various reasons, economists have not studied the impact of 
modern intellectual property rights on employment as widely as one
might think.191 However, pursuant to standard intellectual property 
theory, intellectual property rights should be expected to have two major 
effects on the process of technological un/employment192: what this 
Article calls the Incentive Effect and the Distribution Effect.
1. The Incentive Effect
The Incentive Effect predicts that the incentives generated by 
intellectual property laws magnify and accelerate the pace of 
technological un/employment. The chance to obtain an exclusive right 
increases the incentive to invent and commercialize any given innovation
at any given point in time. Within the entire universe of innovation, at 
least some will be labor-saving innovations. At least some of these labor-
saving innovations will end up being labor-displacing.193 Therefore, the 
existence of intellectual property laws should make it more likely that any 
given labor-displacing innovation will be invented, commercialized, and 
adopted in industry, and increase the pace at which this occurs.194
The Incentive Effect generates a testable hypothesis. Call the entire 
universe of innovation I, and call the labor-saving subset of all 
innovation, IL. The Incentive Effect predicts that intellectual property 
rights should, in the aggregate, increase the overall size of IL by providing 
the opportunity to exclude others from using the protected innovation. 
Thus, the size of IL in the presence of intellectual property rights, call it 
ILIP, should be greater than the size of IL in the absence of IP, call it IL0. If 
the Incentive Effect holds true, intellectual property rights increase the 
size of the universe of innovations that are labor-displacing. 
                                                                                                                     
191. Economists’ work usually seeks to answer a different question: innovation’s impact on 
employment. They view intellectual property as mere proxies for innovation itself. See, e.g., Van 
Roy et al., supra note 71, at 3–4 (finding that higher levels of innovation, as measured by forward-
weighted patent citations, had a positive impact on employment at firms in high-tech
manufacturing sectors).
192. Again, technological un/employment means the simultaneous creation and elimination 
of jobs due to advances in technology via the mechanisms discussed in Part II.  
193. See Part II.A for an explanation of labor-displacing.
194. Obviously, intellectual property is not the only factor influencing invention and 
adoption of labor-saving developments. See supra Part I.A.2 (discussing five factors that go into 
the decision of whether to automate).
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ILIP > IL0
Proving the Incentive Effect is not as difficult as it might at first 
appear, if readers are willing to assume that intellectual property has a 
positive net impact on the total universe of innovation in the long run. 195
If the whole universe of innovation gets bigger, then the subset of 
innovation that is labor-saving also gets much bigger, so long as there is 
nothing about intellectual property that leads inventors to favor 
investment in labor-creating innovations. This caveat is discussed in 
greater detail below.196
One way to disprove the Incentive Effect would be if there were zero 
or very few intellectual property rights obtained for labor-saving 
inventions. This would suggest that intellectual property is insignificant 
in the mix of factors affecting the decision to invent labor-saving 
solutions to problems. However, the patent record reveals that companies 
regularly seek to protect labor-saving innovations through the patent 
system. There are many famous labor-saving patents from the Industrial 
Revolution, such as several early patents on the steamboat, famous for 
outpacing boats operated “by any other power,”197 and the cotton 
harvester, advertised as “having a large capacity for work.”198 The 
automated teller machine (ATM), discussed in Part II, was covered by 
patents lauding its cost cutting potential.199 A search for the term “labor-
saving” in Google Patents reveals over 80,000 results, such as labor-
saving long arm gardening shears,200 a labor-saving materials 
dispenser,201 and a labor-saving consolidated checkout system.202 The 
                                                                                                                     
195. In the short run, intellectual property rights would actually do the opposite: slow down 
adoption of labor-saving technologies for as long as they are protected by an exclusive right. See 
Robert Merges & Richard Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L.
REV. 839, 868 (1990) (discussing classic studies showing a “tradeoff between increased inventive 
effort resulting from longer anticipated patent life and greater deadweight costs associated with 
longer monopoly”). This conclusion assumes that intellectual property scopes and term lengths 
are appropriately tailored so as to limit needless monopoly costs as well as negative impacts on 
cumulative innovation. Cf. id. at 873–74 (observing difficulties of tailoring to limit costs).
196. See infra Part II.C.2.
197. See Hrdy, supra note 165, at 78, 105 (discussing John Fitch’s 1791 patent).
198. U.S. Patent No. 526,209 (filed June 17, 1893) (issued Sept. 18, 1894). The Cotton-
Harvester’s stated objective was to produce a “simple and durable apparatus” for harvesting 
cotton, “capable of operation by unskilled labor,” and “having a large capacity for work.” Id.
199. For instance, the objective of U.S. Patent No. 3,761,682, for a “Credit Card Automatic 
Currency Dispenser,” was “[t]o provide the consumer with a source of ready cash without the 
expense of branch banking” and to “make cash available to bank customers on a 24 hour basis.” 
U.S. Patent No. 3,761,682 (filed Oct. 7, 1971). 
200. U.S. Patent No. 7,530,172 B1 (filed May 30, 2007).
201. U.S. Patent No. 5,592,760 (filed July 25,1995).
202. U.S. Patent No. 5,497,853 (filed June 5, 1992).
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term “automation” yields over 300,000 results, including several recent 
patents involving “sales force automation”203 and “home automation 
system[s].”204 The term “autonomous vehicle” alone yields over 40,000 
results, several of which are owned by Uber Technologies.205
To illustrate how labor-saving patents are presented, take NCR Corp’s 
patent for a labor-saving consolidated checkout system—the self-service 
checkout terminals we can now use at the grocery store and the 
pharmacy.206 Observing that “the largest expenditures” in the retail 
industry besides “the cost of the goods sold” are “the cost of labor 
expended,” the patent then discusses at length the invention’s goal to 
“reduce labor costs” associated with grocery and supermarket 
transactions.207 The patent aims to reduce labor costs by “reduc[ing] the 
number of occasions in which an employee of the retailer must intervene 
in the customer’s transaction relative to self-service checkout terminals 
which have heretofore been designed.”208 In other words, the invention’s 
primary objective is to reduce the amount of labor required to perform 
the task to as close to zero as possible.
The fact that a large number of labor-saving inventions have been 
patented does not indicate any influence on innovation stemming from
the ease of obtaining a patent. If, instead, there were few labor-saving 
inventions in the patent record, this would potentially indicate that 
increased difficulty of obtaining a patent does influence innovation. 
However, if these patents are having their desired effect on the amount 
and pace of innovation, they also must be having a magnifying effect on 
labor-saving innovation and thus on technological un/employment.
2. Caveats
It is important to emphasize that the Incentive Effect does not 
hypothesize that intellectual property rights enlarge only the size of IL.
Rather, intellectual property rights enlarge the size of the entire universe 
of innovation, including IL. In other words, this Article does not 
necessarily claim that intellectual property’s incentive mechanism—for 
                                                                                                                     
203. U.S. Patent No. 7,340,410 B1 (filed June 13, 2002).
204. U.S. Patent No. 6,473,661 B1 (filed Mar. 15, 2000).
205. E.g., U.S. Patent Nos. 9,557,183 B1, 9,603,158 B1, 9,616,896 B1, 9,672,446 B1,
9,432,929 B1.
206. U.S. Patent No. 6,522,772 B1 (filed Sept. 30, 1998). The National Cash Register
Company was founded in 1884 by John H. Patterson. Company, NCR,
https://www.ncr.com/company [https://perma.cc/F8SG-GGM4]. NCR Corp. has since developed 
many machines to facilitate consumer transactions, including cash registers, ATMs, and self-
service kiosks. See id. Patterson’s first patent for a cash register has a grant date of 1889. See
U.S. Patent No. 414,440 (issued Nov. 5, 1889).
207. U.S. Patent No. 6,522,772 B1 col. 1 ll. 14–20.
208. Id. col. 3 ll. 31–35.
33
Hrdy: Intellectual Property and the End of Work
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,
336 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71
instance, the fact that intellectual property relies on a right to exclude209—
leads businesses to prefer labor-saving innovations over labor-creating 
innovations.210
To illustrate the point by way of example, the presence of intellectual 
property does not necessarily mean Google is more likely to invent a new 
kind of automated car as opposed to a new kind of human-operated car. 
But the presence of intellectual property does mean Google is more likely 
to invent all types of new cars, including fully automated cars, and to do 
so faster than it otherwise would. Note that, on the flip side, there is no 
evidence to suggest that intellectual property encourages investing in 
labor-creating innovations. To the contrary, as discussed in Part II.A, 
market forces already encourage investing in automation, and it seems 
reasonable to assume that intellectual property would magnify those 
incentives. Thus, all else being equal, in this example Google would be 
more likely to invent the automated car than the new kind of human-
operated one.
There is another crucial caveat. There is no guarantee that any given 
labor-saving innovation will end up being labor-displacing. In the past, 
new technologies from the cotton gin to the ATM ended up creating more 
jobs than they destroyed, at least in net terms. Even inventions that permit 
total automation of tasks, such as a fully automated vehicle, can end up 
generating new tasks that people can be paid to perform. This is what 
technological un/employment is all about. Again, for all the reasons 
discussed in Part II.C, this does not completely solve the problem. The 
long-term concern is that in the future machines will take over all 
conceivable tasks—the job of the engineer who makes the vehicle as well 
as the job of the driver. The more realistic, present-day concern is that the 
gains from technological advances are not equally distributed. A driver 
cannot become an engineer overnight; becoming an engineer takes a 
lifetime of comparative privilege and resources that most people do not 
have. This second point becomes very important in light of the next Part’s 
argument: that intellectual property tends to exacerbate the division of 
returns between technological un/employment’s winners and losers.
                                                                                                                     
209. Some have argued, for instance, that patents, which provide a right to exclude in 
exchange for disclosure, may lead innovators to prefer certain types of inventions that are easier 
to exclude and more difficult to keep secret. See, e.g., Amy Kapczynski & Talha Syed, The 
Continuum of Excludability and the Limits of Patents, 122 YALE L.J. 1900, 1905 (2013).
210. That said, when assessing damages in patent cases, courts have held damages may 
include the profits the infringer would have expected to obtain from savings on labor. This could 
mean patentees have an incentive, beyond the strong incentives they already have, to invest 
specifically in inventions that save on labor costs, knowing they can recover damages based on 
future infringers’ savings on labor. See, e.g., Trio Process Corp. v. L. Goldstein’s Sons, Inc., 612 
F.2d 1353, 1355–57 (3d Cir. 1980); Doten v. City of Boston, 138 F. 406, 406–07 (1st Cir. 1905).    
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3.  The Distribution Effect
The Distribution Effect is an outgrowth of the Incentive Effect. The 
Distribution Effect has two parts. First, intellectual property increases 
returns for intellectual property owners by giving them a right to exclude, 
thereby increasing demand and wages for people who possess the skills 
necessary to generate intellectual property (“IP-generators”). Second, 
because at least some of this same intellectual property involves labor-
displacing innovations, this contributes to lower demand and wages for 
people whose core skills are more easily replaced by machines and who 
are not capable of generating intellectual property (“non-IP-
generators”).211 The upshot is that intellectual property magnifies the 
division of rewards between generators of intellectual property and the 
workers whom their innovations replace.
The Distribution Effect generates at least one core hypothesis: that 
demand and wages for IP-generators should be exponentially higher than 
for non-IP-generators. Proving the Distribution Effect is difficult, in large 
part because it is difficult to isolate intellectual property’s impact on 
employment and wages as opposed to innovation’s impact.212 But several 
pieces of evidence suggest that intellectual property, in specific, may 
contribute to comparatively higher wages for IP-generators.
First, as already mentioned, data from the last several decades shows 
a correlation between technological advances and increased wages for 
“high-skill” as compared to “low-skill” workers.213 Second, evidence 
shows that wages in geographic regions with high levels of innovation 
and higher levels of patenting per entity—“brain hubs” like Silicon 
Valley, California—tend to be higher than wages in other regions.214
                                                                                                                     
211. For purposes of simplicity, workers are divided into two groups: “IP-generators,” who 
generate valuable intellectual property and are not easily replaced by machines, and “non-IP-
generators,” who do not generate valuable intellectual property and whose skills are more easily 
replaced by machines. This assumes IP-generators are less likely to be replaced by machines than 
non-IP-generators, which is not necessarily true. It also assumes that returns from intellectual 
property trickle down to IP-generators, which is also not necessarily true, since IP-generators do 
not always own the intellectual property that they generate. This complexity is discussed further 
below. This simplicity obviously does not map precisely onto reality; but other commentators on 
this topic make similarly simplistic distinctions between “high-skill” and “low-skill” workers all 
the time. See, e.g., GOLDIN & KATZ, supra note 70, at 94–96.
212. The recent USPTO report stresses that this connection is tenuous. U.S. PATENT &
TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 1, at i (“[O]ur methodology does not permit us to attribute 
[differences in economic indicators such as employment, wages, and value added] to IP 
alone . . . .”).
213. See, e.g., BRYNJOLFSSON & MCAFEE, supra note 28, at 39–40.
214. I review the connection between innovation, patenting, and wages in Hrdy, supra note 
40, at 1317–22; see also MORETTI, supra note 72, at 72–97 (observing that innovation hubs have 
a higher concentration of skilled workers and arguing that this leads to higher wages for the entire 
community).
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Lastly and most compellingly, several studies purport to find 
employees in IP-intensive industries—in which companies own more 
intellectual property per size—have comparatively higher wages than 
workers in other industries.215 To give just one example, the recent 
USPTO report, mentioned in the Introduction, found that wages in “IP-
intensive” industries are forty-six percent higher than in other industries 
that are not classified as IP-intensive.216
These correlations between prevalence of intellectual property and
wages are particularly interesting because they suggest that returns from 
intellectual property—which go principally to the companies that own 
the intellectual property, such as Alphabet—are shared with the people 
who actually generate that intellectual property, such as, say, engineers 
who work for Alphabet. In other words, intellectual property does not just 
increase returns for owners, but also increases wages for IP-generators in
cases where ownership is divided between employer and employee.
There are several mechanisms by which intellectual property might have 
this effect on wages. First, firms may “share” some of the rents from 
intellectual property with employees whose skills are necessary to obtain 
those rents.217 Second, firms may pay IP-generating employees more in 
order to keep them from working for competitors and from sharing their 
secrets.218 Third, employees may be able to more easily signal their 
abilities to the job market if they can obtain intellectual property.219
Again, there is no airtight proof that intellectual property rights, in 
specific, cause these higher wages. It could be that people who are IP-
generators have more education and skill than other people and are in 
higher demand because they are scarcer. This Article merely suggests the 
                                                                                                                     
215. See GREENHALGH & ROGERS, supra note 42, at 277 (discussing studies finding the 
innovation rents variable is “a significant determinant of higher wages,” with as much as 20–30% 
of rents generated through innovation going to workers).
216. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 1 (“Private wage and salary workers in 
IP-intensive industries continue to earn significantly more than those in non-IP-intensive 
industries. In 2014, workers in IP-intensive industries earned an average weekly wage of $1,312, 
46 percent higher than the $896 average weekly wages in non-IP-intensive industries in the private 
sector. This wage premium has largely grown over time from 22 percent in 1990 to 42 percent in 
2010 and 46 percent in 2014.”). 
217. See GREENHALGH & ROGERS, supra note 42, at 277.
218. See Andrea Contigiani et al., Trade Secrets and Innovation: Evidence from the 
“Inevitable Disclosure” Doctrine, 39 STRAT. MGMT. J. 2921, 2925 (2018); Jonathan M. Barnett 
& Ted Sichelman, Revisiting Labor Mobility in Innovation Markets 30 (Univ. of S. Cal. Law Sch., 
Working Paper No. 207, 2016), https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/76907918.pdf [https://perma.cc/
TQE2-LGDL].
219. For instance, it is theorized that inventors of high-quality patents can obtain higher 
wages when they are able to signal their skills to other firms. See Contigiani et al., supra note 218,
at 2925–26 n.6 (assuming that “high-skill inventors” with the ability to produce “high-quality 
patents” receive a wage premium).
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possibility that one reason these people are paid so well is that they are 
capable of generating intellectual property that will give their employers 
a legal right to exclude others. 
4.  The Case of Self-Driving Cars  
Leaving aside aggregate data, the most compelling evidence for the 
impact of intellectual property on technological un/employment may be
a contemporary case study: self-driving cars.220 Corporations are pouring 
billions of dollars into self-driving car research, and the U.S. government 
is contemplating following suit.221 Start-ups can raise millions to develop 
self-driving vehicle technology.222 Salaries for experts in this field, such 
as roboticists and engineers, are startlingly high.223
Why is there so much money pouring into self-driving cars? The 
fundamental reason is presumably that self-driving cars can bring 
tremendous value to businesses, which can use them to reduce costs and 
improve speed, safety, and accuracy.224 Companies cannot develop the 
product or compete with others in the industry unless they have top talent, 
                                                                                                                     
220. See generally Samuel D. Adkisson, System-Level Standards: Driverless Cars and the 
Future of Regulatory Design, 40 U. HAW. L. REV. 1, 3–5 (2018) (discussing the future of self-
driving cars).
221. See Bill Vlasic, U.S. Proposes Spending $4 Billion on Self-Driving Cars, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 14, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/15/business/us-proposes-spending-4-billion-
on-self-driving-cars.html [https://perma.cc/KF8T-EMXG]; Toyota Spending $1B on Self-Driving 
Car Research, REUTERS (Nov. 6, 2015), https://www.cnbc.com/2015/11/06/toyota-spending-1b-
on-self-driving-car-research.html [https://perma.cc/2BHD-PZHA].  
222. See Max Chafkin & Josh Eidelson, These Truckers Work Alongside the Coders Trying 
to Eliminate Their Jobs, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (June 22, 2017), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2017-06-22/these-truckers-work-alongside-the-
coders-trying-to-eliminate-their-jobs [https://perma.cc/2Q2A-SY4S]; Liza Lin, Daimler Gets a 
Foothold in China’s Self-Driving Car Market, WALL ST. J. (July 24, 2017),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/daimler-invests-in-beijing-based-self-driving-startup-momenta-
1500930180 [https://perma.cc/C94N-C3TP].
223. See Johana Buiyan, Ex-Googler Sebastian Thrun says the Going Rate for Self-Driving 
Talent is $10 Million per Person, RECODE (Sept. 17, 2016, 11:30 AM), https://www.recode.net/
2016/9/17/12943214/sebastian-thrun-self-driving-talent-pool [https://perma.cc/N62K-6R97];
Cade Metz, Tech Giants are Paying Huge Salaries for Scarce A.I. Talent, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 22,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/22/technology/artificial-intelligence-experts-salaries.
html [https://perma.cc/996E-QGJ2].
224. See, e.g., Rogers, supra note 22, at 100–01 (discussing the temptation for Uber to switch 
to autonomous vehicles); Laura Stevens & Tim Higgins, Amazon Forms Team to Focus on 
Driverless Technology, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 24, 2017, 8:03 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
amazon-team-focuses-on-exploiting-driverless-technology-1493035203 [https://perma.cc/
CW2G-XQGP] (discussing ways Amazon may incorporate self-driving cars into its package 
delivery in order to cut costs and improve delivery service).
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so they lure workers with the prospect of huge salaries.225 But another 
reason could be the expectation that, at the end of the road, these workers 
will generate valuable intellectual property, including trade secrets as 
well as patents, that can be used to exclude competitors or licensed to 
others for high fees.226 The ability to generate intellectual property is 
obviously not the only reason companies are investing in self-driving cars 
or in IP-generating workers.227 But absent the chance for exclusive rights, 
self-driving cars might not be quite such a profitable industry, and these 
people might not be quite so well paid.
Meanwhile, the very same intellectual property that allows IP owners
to achieve higher profits, and thus IP-generators to achieve higher wages,
simultaneously threatens the jobs and earning power of truck drivers and 
other people who drive for a living—non-IP generators.228 Even now, the 
wage differential is striking. While base pay for engineers in the self-
driving vehicle field is well over $200,000 per year, truck drivers’ median 
pay is around $40,000 per year and will presumably fall as use of 
autonomous trucks is increasingly adopted.229
This difference might not be problematic if the numbers were 
different—if there were more jobs available for people to be engineers 
working on autonomous vehicles than there were for people to be truck 
drivers. But at least currently, companies developing autonomous 
vehicles hire comparatively few human workers in relation to the
companies’ net worth.230 The American Trucking Association reports 
that “there are approximately 3.5 million professional truck drivers in the 
                                                                                                                     
225. For instance, Anthony Levandowski sold Otto to Uber for $700 million. Robotocists
from Carnegie Mellon came on board, lured away from academia with huge salaries. See Johana 
Bhuiyan, Inside Uber’s Self-Driving Car Mess, RECODE (Mar. 24, 2017, 4:35 PM), 
http://www.recode.net/2017/3/24/14737438/uber-self-driving-turmoil-otto-travis-kalanick-civil-
war [https://perma.cc/FM4X-SD94].
226. See Waymo LLC v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. C 17-00939 WHA, 2017 WL 2123560, at 
*1–2, *7 (N.D. Cal. May 15, 2017) (bringing claims against Uber for theft of trade secrets under 
state and federal law); cf. John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435, 439 (2004) 
(noting that the decision to litigate patents may be representative of their perceived value).
227. See supra Part I.C.1 (discussing the fundamentals affecting the decision to automate);
supra Part I.C.5 (discussing the skills gap).
228. See Chafkin & Eidelson, supra note 222.
229. Id.; see also Alan Ohnsman, Autonomous Car Race Creates $400k Engineering Jobs 
for Top Silicon Valley Talent, FORBES (Mar. 27, 2017, 12:33 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
alanohnsman/2017/03/27/autonomous-car-race-creates-400k-engineering-jobs-for-top-silicon-
valley-talent/#5fe9355814a3 [https://perma.cc/ACP5-5D3W] (discussing salaries of self-driving 
car engineers).
230. See WEST, supra note 34, at 6 (“Many of the large tech firms have achieved broad 
economic scale without a large number of employees.”); see also Chafkin & Eidelson, supra note 
222 (“[Otto] had fewer than 100 employees when Uber Technologies Inc. acquired it for $700 
million.”).  
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United States.”231 Even if the United States could successfully retrain 
former drivers to be engineers, there would not be enough jobs to go 
around.232
III. THE CASE FOR A PRO-EMPLOYMENT INNOVATION POLICY
Part II argued that intellectual property facilitates and accelerates the 
pace of technological un/employment and exacerbates inequality 
between developers of labor-displacing innovations and others who are 
displaced by them. If accurate, this thesis complicates the conventional 
view that intellectual property rights “create jobs.”233 It is more accurate 
to say that intellectual property rights spur innovation, and that this 
innovation both creates and destroys jobs.
This raises a normative issue. Should the government adopt policies 
to alleviate unemployment and inequality brought about by technological 
change? For instance, should the government do anything about the truck 
drivers who lose their jobs when self-driving cars become the norm? 
Some might say “do nothing.” Innovation increases productivity,
provides consumers a better lifestyle, and is good for the economy in the 
long run.234 The fact that innovation has negative as well as positive 
effects on society is the price of progress. However, that response is 
unlikely to satisfy the many commentators mentioned in Part I who 
believe technological change is having an increasingly negative impact 
on the quality and distribution of work.235 Moreover, as revealed in Part 
II, government-granted intellectual property rights actually exacerbate 
these problems by increasing the returns from innovation. It is therefore
conceivable that in the near future, some legislators will seek to use 
intellectual property as a policy tool to address concerns surrounding 
technological un/employment. As this Part shows, the main way the 
                                                                                                                     
231. Truck Drivers in the USA, ALLTRUCKING.COM, http://www.alltrucking.com/faq/truck-
drivers-in-the-usa/ [https://perma.cc/LL8D-V49H]. The total number of people employed in the 
industry, including those in positions that do not entail driving, “exceeds 8.7 million.” Id.; see
also Ben Leubsdorf, Self-Driving Cars Could Transform Jobs Held by 1 in 9 U.S. Workers, WALL 
ST. J. (Aug. 14, 2017, 10:18 AM), https://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2017/08/14/self-driving-cars-
could-transform-jobs-held-by-1-in-9-u-s-workers/ [https://perma.cc/3Z4K-LGAE] (noting 
Commerce Department economists predict the approximately 3.8 million people who drive taxis, 
trucks, and other vehicles for a living may either be displaced or see their wages fall drastically).
232. See supra Part I.C.5.
233. See Leahy, supra note 12.
234. See, e.g., JOSH LERNER, THE ARCHITECTURE OF INNOVATION: THE ECONOMICS OF
CREATIVE ORGANIZATIONS 16 (2012) (“Innumerable studies have documented the strong
connection between new discoveries and economic prosperity across nations and over time.”).
235. See, e.g., Estlund, supra note 22, at 309–12 (concluding that employment law should 
intervene to alleviate the plight of workers in a world of increasing automation); see also
discussion supra Part I.C (discussing these commentators and their perspectives).
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government could do so is by using the intellectual property regime, 
likely in combination with the tax system, to reduce the amount of labor-
displacing innovations in the economy and mitigate the impacts of those 
innovations on workers.236
Anticipating this development, this Part assesses the main policy 
mechanisms by which the government could, if it chooses, intervene to 
alleviate the effects of technological un/employment.
But first, this Article must address certain threshold objections.
A. Threshold Objections  
1.  The “Productivity is Everything” Objection
The first objection—the “productivity is everything” objection—is
that any policy with the goal of increasing, rather than reducing, the 
amount of human labor required to complete a task must by definition 
make companies and individuals less productive, and therefore retard 
economic growth.237 As Professor Daniel Hemel puts this argument, 
the ratio of economic outputs (in dollars) to human labor 
inputs (in hours) is the very definition of labor productivity. 
And gross domestic product is simply hours worked times 
labor productivity. . . . If we want GDP growth, then we 
either have to work longer hours (which doesn’t sound fun) 
or raise labor productivity.
. . . .
. . . [S]o if a “robot” is simply an innovation that reduces 
the ratio of human labor inputs to economic outputs 
significantly, then what we need is robots galore.238
In other words, argues Professor Hemel, the government should not 
be using policy to reduce the amount of labor-saving innovation in the 
economy, but to increase it. Doing the opposite—say, taxing businesses 
that employ robots—would be grave error. Not only would it become 
generally more difficult to start a business,239 but companies, and 
innovators, would be forced to direct resources towards solutions that are 
                                                                                                                     
236. See infra Part III.C.3.a.
237. See Daniel Hemel, Should Robots Be Subsidized? Probably, MEDIUM (Aug. 17, 2017), 
https://medium.com/whatever-source-derived/should-robots-be-subsidized-18909e1fdb64
[https://perma.cc/YT43-NZG4].
238. Id. (“As Paul Krugman puts it: ‘Productivity isn’t everything, but in the long run it is 
almost everything.’”).
239. Professor Cooter, for instance, argues that one reason for the comparative poverty of 
certain nations is that the state places a “heavy regulatory burden” on entrepreneurs seeking to 
create new companies and therefore hinders economic growth. Robert Cooter, Innovation, 
Information, and the Poverty of Nations, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 373, 387–88 (2005).
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less efficient, costing more per unit of output. For example, businesses 
might use humans instead of robots even when robots are far cheaper or 
better suited to the task. Research firms might invest in comparatively 
inefficient technological solutions like multi-human-driven motor 
vehicles in order to obtain some government subsidy or avoid running 
afoul of some new tax or regulation. 
And this is not all. Professor Bessen, whose work was discussed in 
Part I.B, might add that if government guides investment away from 
labor-saving solutions, then workers would no longer have incentives to 
educate themselves appropriately for the technologies of the future.240
Secure in the sense that the government will not let them be automated 
out of work, workers might not work as hard to train themselves and 
become more productive. Why bother training for a future job 
maintaining or interfacing with robots when you can just keep driving for 
a living?241 In short, markets would no longer deliver accurate signals to 
people about what occupations to train for.242
This might not be so terrible if the government actually succeeds in 
halting automation in its tracks. Businesses in the jurisdiction would be 
less efficient, but so would everyone else. Yet, economic growth is not 
determined in a vacuum. Assuming significant levels of global 
competition are permitted—a certainty in today’s world of increasing 
globalization243—any nation that adopts policies to discourage labor-
displacing innovations, like self-driving cars, would face competition 
from neighbors that do not invoke such a policy. That country would fall 
behind others and see its economy falter in comparison.244
                                                                                                                     
240. See BESSEN, supra note 24, at 102–04 (discussing importance and difficulty of learning 
skills needed to operate labor-reducing innovations such as power looms).
241. See Daniela Hernandez, Seven Jobs Robots Will Create—or Expand, WALL ST. J. (Apr.
29, 2018, 10:07 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/seven-jobs-robots-will-createor-expand-
1525054021 [http://perma.cc/VH3T-SFG2].
242. See Weaver, supra note 155 (arguing that, when it comes to predicting which skills will 
be needed in the economy, “there is no substitute for coordination between the supply side of the 
labor market (workers and their skill investments) and the demand side (employers and their skill 
requirements)”).  
243. SUZANNE BERGER & MIT INDUS. PERFORMANCE CTR., HOW WE COMPETE: WHAT 
COMPANIES AROUND THE WORLD ARE DOING TO MAKE IT IN TODAY’S GLOBAL ECONOMY 9 (2005) 
(defining “globalization” as “changes in the international economy and in domestic economies”
in the direction of a “single global market,” in which wages, prices, and interest rates are the same 
around the world).
244. A historic analogy is France’s agenda to create jobs in the 1970s, including subsidizing 
industries “most likely to hire large numbers of workers”—all of which left France unable “to 
adapt to a world of rapid technological change and intense global competition.” MARC LEVINSON,
AN EXTRAORDINARY TIME: THE END OF THE POSTWAR BOOM AND THE RETURN OF THE ORDINARY 
ECONOMY 204 (2016); see also Liz Alderman, French Companies Have Newfound 
Freedom . . . to Fire, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/23/
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2.  The Hayekian Objection
The second objection—the “Hayekian objection”—is that even if 
reducing or slowing the pace of labor-displacing innovation were 
desirable, the government lacks the capacity to do so.245 As Professor 
Amy Kapczynski has observed, intellectual property scholarship is 
deeply influenced by the Hayekian view that, all else being equal, free 
markets should be preferred over the government for allocating resources 
because the government lacks knowledge of what types of goods are 
needed and how much of them to supply.246 If the government were to 
begin dictating which types of innovations to pursue—telling businesses 
to invest in human-operated machines, for instance—this would amount 
to precisely the sort of “industrial policy”247 that governments seek to 
avoid by adopting technology-neutral intellectual property systems in 
lieu of direct government financing for innovation.248 On this view, if the 
government were to restructure innovation policy to alleviate the effects 
of technological un/employment, this would reverse a major benefit of 
using intellectual property in the first place by exposing the incentive 
system to government influence. 
B. Justifications for Intervention
Given these concerns, we might think no country should or would 
adopt a policy that seeks to reduce, rather than to increase, the amount of 
labor-displacing innovations in the marketplace. Yet there are several 
                                                                                                                     
business/france-labor-jobs.html [https://perma.cc/6S8Q-GLPF] (discussing recent regulatory 
changes in France making it easier to hire and fire workers in France in order to revive growth).
245. Friedrich Hayek was an Austrian economist famous for objecting to John Maynard 
Keynes’ view that government should subsidize demand in order to stimulate spending and 
employment. See, e.g., F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519,
519, 524, 530 (1945) (arguing a “single mind” cannot produce a solution to economic problems 
the same way interactions between all people in the market can); see also NICHOLAS WAPSHOTT,
KEYNES HAYEK: THE CLASH THAT DEFINED MODERN ECONOMICS 43–44 (2011) (discussing the 
fundamental differences in Hayek and Keynes beliefs).
246. Amy Kapczynski, Intellectual Property’s Leviathan, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 131, 
134 (2014) (“[T]he conventional theory [of IP law] . . . implicitly invokes a Hayekian hypothesis 
about information asymmetries.”).
247. See, e.g., Cooter, supra note 239, at 378–79 (arguing that government “manipulations” 
of the market in the form of taxes, subsidies, and regulations amount to “industrial policy” or 
“technology policy,” in which government unwisely seeks to guide market decisions).
248. See Hrdy, supra note 40, at 1303–04; see also Kapczynski, supra note 246 (discussing 
the government creates intellectual property rights and is “incapable of effectively engaging more 
directly in the organization of information production”); Daniel Hemel & Lisa Ouellette, Beyond 
the Patents–Prizes Debate, 92 TEX. L. REV. 303, 327 (2013) (discussing the distinction between 
“market-set” and “government-set” innovation incentives).  
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justifications for intervention. These justifications may give pause to even
the fiercest skeptics of government intervention in markets.249
1.  Correcting Externalities
The first justification is that labor-displacing innovations generate 
negative externalities. A negative externality is a cost conveyed to others 
that is not represented in a market transaction.250 Pollution is a classic 
example. Imagine a factory that emits pollution into the environment 
when it manufactures its products. The true costs of the factory’s 
activity—to the earth or to people who live close to the factory—are 
“external” to the market in the sense that they are not taken into account 
in the factory’s decision to engage in the polluting activity.251 Taxation is 
often posited as a way to force companies to “internalize” these negative 
externalities.252 The factory in this example would likely pollute less if it 
were subject to a pollution tax.
Some commentators have asserted that technologies that permit 
automation, such as factory robots, impose negative externalities on 
others—not unlike pollution. As two well-known economists put the 
argument, “automating tasks reduces employment . . . and this has a first-
order effect on workers . . . . [I]innovators do not internalize this 
externality.”253
                                                                                                                     
249. Cf. Miranda Perry Fleischer & Daniel Hemel, Atlas Nods: The Libertarian Case for a
Basic Income, 2017 WIS. L. REV. 1189, 1189 (defending a “universal basic income” against 
objections from libertarians); see also N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS
11–13 (6th ed. 2012) (discussing common “market failures” that might warrant government 
intervention in markets).
250. See Robert Cooter & Ariel Porat, Liability Externalities and Mandatory Choices: 
Should Doctors Pay Less?, 1 J. TORT L. 1, 7 (2006); Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, 
Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 262 (2007) (“[P]ositive (or negative) externalities are 
benefits (costs) realized by one person as a result of another person’s activity without payment 
(compensation). Externalities generally are not fully factored into a person’s decision to engage 
in the activity.”); see also MANKIW, supra note 249, at 12 (“[A]n externality . . . is the impact of 
one person’s actions on the well-being of a bystander.”).
251. Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 250, at 300.
252. E.g., Cooter & Porat, supra note 250, at 1, 24; Fleischer & Hemel, supra note 249, at 
1232.
253. Daron Acemoglu & Pascual Restrepo, The Race Between Machine and Man: 
Implications of Technology for Growth, Factor Shares and Employment 30 (NBER, Working 
Paper No. 22,252, 2016), http://cdi.mecon.gov.ar/bases/doc/nber/w22252.pdf [https://perma.cc/
YGJ4-XNQY]. For other examples, see Loren Nerhus, Automation and the Labor Force, 16 
MAJOR THEMES ECON. 65, 66 (2014) (“Even though everyone in society benefits from 
improvements in technology, it does create negative externalities for some segments in the short 
run.”); Ernest Chi-Hin Ng, Taxing the Robots and Other Externalities, BUDDHISTDOOR 
GLOBAL (Mar. 17, 2017), https://www.buddhistdoor.net/features/taxing-the-robots-and-other-
externalities [https://perma.cc/4S64-HJMR] (“[T]echnology is creating new jobs but it is also 
destroying some old ones even faster. . . . In economics, negative consequences not directly 
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This assertion at first appears counterintuitive. After all, innovation is 
the opposite of pollution, generating positive rather than negative 
externalities in the form of new ideas that benefit others. According to 
the theoretical framework associated with Harold Demsetz, the primary 
purpose of patent and copyright laws is to permit companies to internalize 
the benefits of their creations in order to encourage them to innovate, 
notwithstanding the fact that others will benefit from their ideas.254 Yet, 
as Demsetz himself observed, these very same ideas can also create 
negative externalities for those whose livelihoods are tied up in ideas that 
are now obsolete.255 Technological un/employment is merely a species of 
this general problem. New inventions that permit increased automation 
may destroy the jobs of human workers who were previously needed to 
perform those tasks. 
Importantly, the company generating the externality here is not 
typically the employer that chooses to adopt a new machine in lieu of 
workers in order to reduce its costs—for instance, the lettuce farmer who 
decides to use a machine to harvest crops instead of humans in order to 
avoid paying their wages.256 A true externality, like pollution, is a 
negative effect on bystanders “who are not participating in the relevant 
market and thus have not transacted with the provider of the benefits or 
costs.”257 In this case, the lettuce farmer imposes no externalities on 
others who are not already taken into account in the transaction. The 
workers the farmer lets go do participate in the transaction to the extent 
they control the wages they demand for their labor. At least theoretically, 
they can demand lower wages in order to avoid being displaced by the 
machine, assuming the transaction costs involved in negotiating this 
outcome are not too high.258
                                                                                                                     
accounted for in a transaction, but borne by other third parties (society, future generations, the 
ecology, and so forth), are known as negative externalities.”).
254. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 359 
(1967) (“If we extend some degree of private rights to the originators, these ideas will come forth 
at a more rapid pace.”); see also Mark Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding,
83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1031 (2005) (discussing how externalities in intellectual property are 
positive not negative).
255. Demsetz, supra note 254 (“[T]he existence of the private rights [for the originators of 
ideas] does not mean that their effects on the property of others will be directly taken into account. 
A new idea makes an old one obsolete and another old one more valuable.”).  
256. William M. Blair, Farms Reaping a Harvest with Automation, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
10, 1964), https://www.nytimes.com/1964/04/10/farms-reaping-a-harvest-with-automation.html
[https://perma.cc/G5PK-Y5DA].
257. See Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 250.
258. R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15 (1960); see also 
MANKIW, supra note 249, at 210–12 (illustrating this concept).   
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This is sometimes referred to as a “pecuniary externality” versus a 
“technological externality.”259 A technological externality, such as 
pollution imposed on the inanimate environment, occurs outside the 
market; a pecuniary externality is a wealth transfer between private 
parties that occurs within the market.260 As Professors Brett Frischmann 
and Mark Lemley explain, “economists don’t much care about pecuniary 
externalities, reasoning that wealth transfers ‘within’ the market—that is, 
externalities mediated by the price mechanism—result in offsetting 
private costs and benefits.”261
But there are arguably more than pecuniary externalities at work in 
the process of technological un/employment. There are technological 
externalities as well.262 The pollution-spewing factory in this scenario is 
not the employer who merely adopts new machinery to save on costs. It 
is the innovator who develops the labor-displacing invention. The driving 
force behind this technological externality is the same as the driving force 
that motivates government to create intellectual property rights: the fact 
that the innovation can eventually be copied and used by other businesses 
across the economy.263 Thanks in part to intellectual property rights, 
innovators can now be compensated through the sale and licensing of 
their inventions.264 As discussed above in Part II.C, the owners of this 
intellectual property, such as Eli Whitney, NCR Corp., Google, and Uber, 
profit. But they do not internalize the full costs that those same inventions 
impose on workers across the economy—workers whose skills are now 
made obsolete by the advancement of technology.265
If it is true that labor-displacing innovations create negative 
externalities for workers, then policymakers might be justified in 
imposing measures to force innovators to internalize the externalities. 
The economists quoted above, for instance, theorize that “the social 
planner will need to impose a tax on automation . . . in order to combat 
the tendency of the decentralized equilibrium to automate 
                                                                                                                     
259. See Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 250, at 262–63.  
260. Id.
261. Id. at 263.
262. Id. at 262 (“Technological externalities are direct benefits (or costs) realized by third 
parties—agents who are not participating in the relevant market and thus have not transacted with 
the provider of the benefits or costs.”).
263. Id. at 272–73 (“Ideas can be freely copied by others in the absence of a legal rule 
restricting that copying without depriving their creators of the use of the ideas.”). 
264. See id. at 273 (“A patent licensee . . . is buying the right not to be sued for using the 
knowledge she did have, whether because she developed it independently or because she learned 
it from the inventor’s use.”).
265. Demsetz, supra note 254; see also BESSEN, supra note 24, at 19–20 (suggesting that 
technology generates market failures in education).
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excessively.”266 The result of such a tax should be that innovators will 
generate fewer labor-displacing innovations in order to avoid incurring 
the tax. If they choose to innovate anyway, they would have to pay a tax 
that could go towards helping displaced workers or other social programs 
such as education. The precise policy levers available to government are 
discussed at length in Part III.C.267
2.  Effectuating Redistribution
Some may be more moved by appeals to distributive justice than by 
discussion of externalities.268 As discussed in Part I.C.4, the impact of 
innovation on employment is highly uneven across society, 
disproportionately harming some people and helping others.269 It is 
perhaps not surprising, then, that several commentators, including 
famous company executives, have suggested turning to “Keynesian 
policies” of government spending supported by taxation in order to help 
those whose jobs are displaced by automation.270 For instance, Tesla’s 
CEO, Elon Musk, has stated his view that “[artificial intelligence] is the 
biggest risk that we face as a civilization,” and speculated that 
policymakers should try to slow down development and potentially even 
give people a “universal basic income” (UBI) to help them get along 
without paid work.271 The primary motivation behind these views is 
                                                                                                                     
266. Acemoglu & Restrepo, supra note 253; see also Ng, supra note 253 (“Some of these 
negative externalities can be addressed through taxation and/or surcharges.”). Note that Acemoglu 
and Restrepo do not specify whether the tax would be imposed on businesses that adopt robots or 
the owners of the underlying intellectual property.
267. Another policy option would be to impose liability through the tort system. See Cooter
& Porat, supra note 250 (“When markets fail, liability law often improves the situation by making 
injurers compensate victims.”).  
268. See, e.g., Justin Hughes & Robert P. Merges, Copyright and Distributive Justice,
92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 513, 518 (2016); see also MANKIW, supra note 249, at 13 (listing 
alleviating inequality as a potential basis for government intervention in the free market). 
269. BRYNJOLFSSON & MCAFEE, supra note 28, at 39 (“Even when technological progress 
increases productivity and overall wealth, it can also affect the division of rewards, potentially 
making some people worse off than they were before the innovation.”).
270. See, e.g., Jonathan Taplin, Can the Tech Giants Be Stopped?, WALL ST. J. (July 14, 
2017, 2:34 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/can-the-tech-giants-be-stopped-1500057243
[https://perma.cc/P6ER-JLBB].
271. See, e.g., Catherine Clifford, Elon Musk: Robots Will Take Your Jobs, Government Will 
Have to Pay Your Wage, CNBC (Nov. 4, 2016, 2:19 PM) https://www.cnbc.com/2016/11/04/elon
-musk-robots-will-take-your-jobs-government-will-have-to-pay-your-wage.html [https://perma.cc/
87ZH-M6FK]; Tim Higgins, Elon Musk Lays out Worst-Case Scenario for AI Threat, WALL ST.
J. (July 15, 2017, 5:32 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/elon-musk-warns-nations-governors-
of-looming-ai-threat-calls-for-regulations-1500154345 [https://perma.cc/Z7WW-W5E7].
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clearly a desire to correct the injustice of intense inequality—not a 
concern about correcting inefficient market externalities.272
Of course, not everyone will agree that inequality alone is a solid basis 
for adopting a policy that risks slowing down innovation and hindering 
overall productivity. Anti-state libertarians, in particular, may chafe at 
this idea.273 That said, Professor Miranda Fleischer and Professor Hemel 
have argued that even libertarians might agree with some amount of 
redistribution.274 One justification they give is that redistribution itself 
may be akin to a “public good”—a non-rival, non-excludable resource
like a bridge or a road—that benefits many, yet is hard to exclude, and so
will not be generated without some government action.275 They observe
that, along with inequality, pervasive poverty and unemployment among
a large portion of the population can contribute to social ills, such as 
increased crime.276 (Notably, utilizing automation in lieu of human 
employees may exacerbate this connection between unemployment and 
crime because fewer human employees typically means less security and 
fewer “eyes on the street.”277) Therefore, when government adopts 
policies to limit the number of people who are unemployed and who turn
to crime, this permits everyone to benefit from the luxury of being safe.
When viewed in this light, redistribution is not the end in itself, but 
simply a means to achieving the end of a safer world for all.
In sum, whether it is conceptualized as a policy to alleviate inequality, 
or as a policy to alleviate the societal ills that accompany unemployment, 
                                                                                                                     
272. Robert Reich, What if the Government Gave Everyone a Paycheck?, N.Y. TIMES: BOOK 
REV. (July 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/09/books/review/annie-lowrey-give-
people-money-andrew-yang-war-on-normal-people.html [https://perma.cc/LU3V-WXGV]
(reviewing ANNIE LOWREY, GIVE PEOPLE MONEY (2018) and ANDREW YANG, THE WAR ON
NORMAL PEOPLE (2018)) (“A core challenge in the future will be how to redistribute money from 
the ever richer owners of the robots and related technologies to the rest of us, who are otherwise 
likely to become poorer and less secure.”).
273. Fleischer & Hemel, supra note 249, at 1193 (“[L]ibertarianism is—or at least is 
generally thought to be—inhospitable to redistribution.”).
274. Id. at 1194–95.
275. Id. at 1227.
276. Id. at 1224–25. There are various mechanisms through which unemployment may 
contribute to crime, though the precise relationship is a subject of debate. See Matthew D. Melick, 
The Relationship Between Crime and Unemployment, 11 PARK PLACE ECONOMIST 30, 30–31
(2003) (identifying “two major schools of thought regarding the unemployment-crime 
relationship,” one focusing on the “supply of offenders,” which may rise as employment 
opportunities decrease, the other focusing on the “supply of victims,” which may actually fall 
since people have less to steal). 
277. See Shannon Pettypiece & David Voreacos, Walmart’s Out-of-Control Crime Problem 
Is Driving Police Crazy, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Aug. 17, 2016), https://www.bloomberg 
.com/features/2016-walmart-crime/ [https://perma.cc/7365-HRBX] (discussing increased crime 
around Walmart stores since the company began reducing the number of human employees).
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government intervention in the face of increasing automation can 
theoretically be justified—despite the risk of a slight fall in productivity. 
3. A Correction to State Intervention
A final justification for intervention is that intellectual property itself 
can be seen as a form of prior government interference in the free 
market—as simply another form of regulation.278 On this view, 
intellectual property’s negative impacts on some forms of employment 
are similar to other constraints imposed by the state that arguably lead 
companies to shed jobs, such as minimum wage laws that make labor 
more expensive for hiring firms or subsidies embedded into the tax code 
that induce firms to invest in automation rather than labor.279
When government-created intellectual property rights are revealed as 
a driver of technological un/employment, policies to alleviate negative 
effects of the phenomenon on the workforce can be seen simply as 
corrections to guide markets back to where they would be without the 
incentive effects of intellectual property.280 For example, if government 
creates intellectual property, and intellectual property is one reason that 
millions of drivers lose their jobs upon adoption of self-driving cars, then 
perhaps government is justified in taking action to help those drivers.
Crucially, as explored further below, any policies to alleviate social 
ills produced by government action in creating intellectual property must 
be moderated to avoid undermining the reason government creates 
intellectual property in the first place.
C. Crafting a Policy to Address Technological Un/employment
If policymakers are swayed by one or more of these justifications, they 
will need to carefully consider how best to regulate technological 
un/employment. This Part identifies five threshold determinations that 
must be considered in crafting a policy and assesses the various policy 
                                                                                                                     
278. See Mark Lemley, The Regulatory Turn in IP, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 109, 115
(2013) (suggesting that intellectual property law has come more and more to resemble 
government-directed regulation); cf. Mossoff, supra note 165, at 1009 (“[N]atural rights 
philosophy played an important role, albeit hardly single-handedly, in defining and protecting 
patents as privileges in the early American republic.”).   
279. Cf. Hemel & Fleischer, supra note 249, at 1213 (“Some individuals might be unable to 
access the labor market due to constraints imposed by the state, such as the minimum wage or 
licensing laws.” (emphasis added)). See also Abbott & Bogenschneider, supra note 22, at 150 
(explaining various ways that the tax system “encourages automation by providing employers 
with preferential tax treatment for robot workers. . . . Tax policies may thus result in automation 
in some cases in which a firm would other- wise choose a human worker”).
280. But see Hemel & Fleischer, supra note 249, at 1213 (“[T]he fact that the state itself 
stands in the way of full employment would likely not convince a minimal-state libertarian to 
expand the state further by taxing for redistributive purposes.”). 
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options. Ultimately, this Article favors more moderate policy measures 
in lieu of blunt tools like bans.
1.  Whether a Given Innovation Warrants Regulation
The threshold issue for regulators is how to identify an innovation that
warrants regulation. Part I.A defined labor-displacing innovations as a 
subset of labor-saving innovations: innovations that eliminate or 
significantly reduce the labor required to complete a task that would 
otherwise be performed by paid human workers. Sometimes it is easy to 
identify labor-displacing innovations because the inventors advertise 
them that way. Oracle’s “Self-Driving” Database, for instance, can easily 
be classified as a labor-displacing innovation, given that it is advertised 
as being designed to eliminate human labor.281
But most innovations would presumably have less obvious impacts on 
the workforce. Indeed, inventions can have a multitude of possible uses, 
only some of which may have negative impacts on employment. For 
example, Kraft Food’s patented method for making Swiss cheese (the 
“Stine process”) had a long list of benefits, mostly related to the shape 
and size of the cheese produced by the process.282 But it also happened to 
fit more easily into “labor-saving trucks,” permitting a reduction in labor 
costs.283 It would have been difficult to predict this impact ex ante.
Regulators, and courts in individual cases, may be able to make these 
types of determinations, so long as they have sufficient data and a clear 
legal standard. Intellectual property doctrine provides a framework for 
classifying the impacts of “dual use” technologies. For example, the 
Supreme Court has considered the impact, for purposes of copyright
infringement, of a video recording device that both permits unauthorized 
copying of copyrighted content (a bad thing, because it depletes creators’ 
incentives to make content), and generates benefits like recording for 
purposes of “time-shifting” (a good thing, because now people can record 
content to view later). In these cases, the Supreme Court has directed 
courts to consider whether the technology is “capable of substantial 
noninfringing uses.”284
In this context, regulators can ask whether an innovation that has some 
labor-displacing uses—such as an automated surgical tool with greater 
                                                                                                                     
281. See supra Part I.A.
282. Kraft Foods Co. v. Walther Dairy Prods., 118 F. Supp. 1, 20 (W.D. Wis. 1954), aff’d,
234 F.2d 279 (7th Cir. 1956).  
283. Id. (noting that one benefit of the Stine process was that “[l]abor saving devices such as 
lift trucks [could] be used for handling the cheese made by the Stine process, which are not 
feasible with the large wheel Swiss”).
284. Dotan Oliar, The Copyright-Innovation Tradeoff: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Intentional Infliction of Harm, 64 STAN. L. REV. 951, 958 (2012) (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v.
Universal Studios Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984)).
49
Hrdy: Intellectual Property and the End of Work
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,
352 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71
precision than a human surgeon could ever achieve—is also “capable of 
substantial non-labor-displacing uses” that outweigh adverse impacts on 
some peoples’ jobs—such as saving lives that would otherwise be lost in 
surgery. At the least, this type of legal standard could serve as a starting 
point for making the difficult decision of whether to regulate.
2.  Whether to Target the Point-of-Invention or the Point-of-Adoption
The second question to consider is when to regulate within the 
innovation lifecycle. As described by Professor Brett Frischmann, there 
are two temporal targets for innovation policy.285 A policy can target ex 
ante investment decisions, which are made when inventors “decide how 
to allocate resources among prospective inventive prospects,” or ex post
investment decisions, which are made after the results of the invention 
have been developed.286 Intellectual property rights, research grants, and 
R&D tax incentives, all target the ex ante decision point—whether and 
what to invent.287 But many taxes and regulations target the ex post
decision—whether and how to adopt an invention once it has been 
invented.288
In this context, government would have to decide whether to use 
policy to affect inventors’ incentives or adopters’ incentives. In some 
situations, this might mean regulating totally different entities. Inventors 
of improvements in automation are likely to be research firms, 
universities, or independent inventors, while adopters can be anything 
from large financial firms to pharmacy chains to mom-and-pop
restaurants.289 In other cases, the decision-maker may be the same entity. 
For instance, Uber is both an inventor of self-driving car improvements 
and has plans to adopt it in the Uber ride-sharing business. 
In some ways, the distinction is very important. Regulating at the 
point of invention would presumably make it less likely that companies 
would invent labor-displacing innovations in the first place. In contrast, 
regulating at the point of adoption would permit invention, but it would 
put strings on whether those inventions can be adopted in the 
marketplace. 
                                                                                                                     
285. See Brett Frischmann, Innovation and Institutions: Rethinking the Economics of U.S. 
Science and Technology Policy, 24 VT. L. REV. 347, 356–57 (2000).  
286. Id. at 356.
287. Id. at 356–57.
288. Id. at 356.
289. In these situations, adopters would have to purchase particular embodiments of labor-
displacing technologies through distributors, or they be asked to obtain a license to the underlying 
intellectual property. Either way, IP owners would be profiting due to possession of an exclusive 
right. See Robert Merges, A Transactional View of Property Rights, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1477, 1500 (2005) (viewing a key function of patents as facilitating disclosure and transfer of 
information related to innovations from creators to the most effective developers).
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However, the distinction may not make much difference. Most 
regulations would presumably end up affecting both decisions to invent 
and decisions to adopt. For example, banning drones that can deliver 
packages would deter their adoption in the marketplace, but it would also 
affect decisions to invent in this field.290 Likewise, taxing patents on 
drones that can deliver packages would affect both the decision to invent 
such technology, and the decision of whether to adopt it, since the tax 
would likely be passed on to businesses to some degree. Because of the 
feedback loop between decisions to invent and decisions to adopt, 
whether government regulates at the point of invention or at the point of 
adoption should not strictly matter when it comes to affecting incentives. 
There is, however, a very practical reason why the distinction does 
matter. As discussed above, deciding which innovations are “labor-
displacing” is already a difficult task even with good information. The 
earlier the government attempts to interfere in a technology’s lifecycle, 
the more difficult this classification will become. When regulating at the 
point-of-adoption rather than the point-of-invention, government should 
have a better idea about whether a labor-displacing device will lead to 
significant firing of workers. This weighs in favor of regulating after an 
invention has been put into use.
3. Which Type of Regulatory Mechanism to Use
This Part addresses the question of precisely which mechanism to use. 
There are a multitude of regulatory mechanisms available for alleviating 
technological un/employment.291
a. Bans
The simplest option is to adopt a total ban on a certain labor-displacing 
technologies.292 Some polities might try this option in the coming 
                                                                                                                     
290. The market for the technology would exert a “pull” on the direction of invention. Cf.
Peter Lee, Interface: The Push and Pull of Patents, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2225, 2226 (2009).
291. In general, government can use a “stick”—a negative incentive to deter people from 
acting in a certain way—or a “carrot”—a positive incentive to encourage people to act in a certain 
way. This Article mainly discusses sticks. See Ian Ayres & Amy Kapczynski, Innovation Sticks: 
The Limited Case for Penalizing Failures to Innovate, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1781, 1783 (2015).  
292. A ban could be promulgated at the federal level by an agency within the Department of 
Labor (DOL), U.S. DEP’T LABOR, https://www.dol.gov [https://perma.cc/7JJQ-EYNW], or an 
agency within the Department of Transportation (DOT), such as the National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration (NHTSA), which regulates vehicle design and manufacturing in order to 
improve motor vehicle safety. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC ADMIN., https://www.nhtsa.gov
[https://perma.cc/NB76-7QP8]. But see Adkisson, supra note 220, at 12–18 (noting that under its 
current statutory authority, NHTSA standards must, among other things, “meet the need for motor 
vehicle safety” and not be technologically or economically unfeasible).
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years.293 The effect of a ban is what it sounds like: no more of the banned 
technology within the jurisdiction. Advantages of a ban include that it is 
comparatively easy to administer and, on the surface, cheap. Government 
pays nothing directly, other than the cost of enforcement. Private actors 
also pay nothing directly—though their bottom line may suffer.294
Bans are highly vulnerable to the Hayekian objection.295 With a 
regulatory ban, the government’s lack of knowledge is front and center 
because the government must know at the outset which particular 
innovations to ban.296 Bans are also vulnerable to the “productivity is 
everything” objection.297 Because a ban halts the prohibited technology 
in its tracks, it is likely to negatively impact businesses’ productivity and 
put the jurisdiction at an economic disadvantage.298 In other words, the 
concerns highlighted in Part III.A are in full force. Bans are accordingly 
unlikely to be a wise policy.
b. Intellectual Property Law
Intellectual property law itself provides another avenue for 
effectuating some of the same goals as a ban. If intellectual property 
increases incentives to generate and commercialize labor-displacing 
innovations, then, by the same token, denying intellectual property for 
labor-displacing innovations would reduce those incentives.
The most feasible way to institute this mechanism is through the 
patent system, the only intellectual property regime in which prior 
application is required to receive protection.299 Like Queen Elizabeth, the 
government, through the USPTO, could begin to deny patents for 
technologies that promise to eliminate significant numbers of jobs. For 
example, if NCR Corp. applies for a patent for a labor-
saving consolidated checkout system, whose express goal is to reduce 
                                                                                                                     
293. For example, India’s transportation minister, Nitin Gadkari, recently floated the idea of 
banning driverless cars in the country, stating, “We will not allow driverless cars in India. We 
don’t need it . . . . Each car gives a job to a driver. Driverless cars will take away those jobs . . . .” 
See Rishi Iyengar, India’s Transport Chief: Driverless Cars Will Kill Transport Jobs, CNN (July 
25, 2017, 11:47 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2017/07/25/technology/india-driverless-cars-
jobs/index.html [https://perma.cc/9QN6-H7KC].
294. See Ayres & Kapczynski, supra note 291, at 1786 (“[I]f a government has a choice 
between a threat or a payment to induce innovation, ceteris paribus, the threat will be cheaper.”).
295. See supra Part III.A.2; see also, e.g., Cooter, supra note 239, at 378–79 (discussing 
various types of “technology policy”).
296. See supra Part III.A.1.
297. See supra Part III.A.1.
298. See supra Part III.A.1; see also Hemel, supra note 237 (discussing the possibility of a 
robot subsidy instead of a robot tax in order to avoid unemployment and economic inequality). 
299. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012); cf. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2012) (providing protection for 
unregistered trademarks).
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labor costs associated with the retail grocery or supermarket industry,300
this would be denied.
While a “job saving patent bar”—barring patents for specific 
inventions—could achieve the desired effect of dampening incentives to 
generate labor-displacing inventions, the idea faces significant 
challenges. The first problem is simply that the patent office lacks legal 
authority to conduct these denials. The obvious legal means to 
accomplish this type of subject matter bar would be the utility 
requirement of Section 101 of the Patent Act.301 However, as presently 
interpreted by the USPTO and the courts, the utility requirement does not 
scrutinize the moral or economic implications of inventions.302 Thus, in 
order to overcome long-accepted doctrine and case law from the Federal 
Circuit,303 a statutory amendment from Congress would almost certainly 
be required.
A more fundamental problem is the USPTO’s limited informational
capacity. Patent examiners would need to be able to accurately discern 
which inventions will threaten the workforce in the future. But the patent 
office has limited information about issues external to patent law.304 To 
mitigate this problem, examiners might only be charged with flagging 
potential labor-displacing inventions. They could then require patentees 
themselves to submit an impact statement delineating how the invention 
is likely to impact the labor market. This would at least permit examiners 
to draw on private knowledge in making its decisions. Alternatively, the 
examiner could put the patent prosecution on hold and forward the 
application and impact statement to a separate agency within the 
Department of Commerce, such as the Small Business Administration 
(SBA). Either way, a subject matter bar would seem to require significant 
information that government is unlikely to possess so early in an 
invention’s lifecycle.305
A distinct objection is that an intellectual property subject matter bar 
seems a highly roundabout way to affect incentives. As explained, 
denying an intellectual property right does not deny the right to use the 
technology. It just denies the exclusive right to do so. Government might 
be better off just banning problem technologies outright. On the other 
                                                                                                                     
300. U.S. Patent No. 6,522,772 B1 col. 1 l. 14–23.
301. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
302. Seymore, supra note 176, at 1047–48.
303. Id. at 1059.
304. See Robert Merges, Intellectual Property in Higher Life Forms: The Patent System and 
Controversial Technologies, 47 MD. L. REV. 1051, 1067–68 (1988) (noting that the patent system 
is not seen as the proper governmental institution in which to make speculative judgments 
regarding the “potential negative consequences” of new technology).
305. See supra Part III.C.3.
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hand, regulators might prefer the fact that a labor-displacing patent bar 
would merely blunt incentives, not ban innovations outright. Denying 
intellectual property rights could represent a compromise option in 
comparison to a total ban. That said, if the government is trying to 
dampen incentives to adopt labor-displacing innovations, it would 
probably be better off using the tax system.306 This is especially true if 
the government wishes to provide aide to displaced workers. Along with 
the informational problem mentioned above, a major downside to the 
intellectual property bar, as compared to a tax, is that it would not directly 
provide aide for workers.307 Workers might be left with the worst of both 
worlds: Subject-matter bars would not actually prevent companies from 
automating, and they would not require any redistribution to workers. 
In sum, even if patent bars are somewhat effectual in deterring 
automation, they would probably be unworkable in practice and represent 
only a partial solution for displaced workers.
c. Tax
Tax represents a natural alternative to the above options, and it is 
likely to be the preferred mechanism of regulation, especially if the 
primary goal is redistribution.308 The taxation mechanism would work as 
follows: Government would impose a tax (a required payment of cash 
into the public fisc) on companies that decide to invent or adopt 
technologies that have an adverse impact on jobs. The tax could be 
imposed on two discrete groups: businesses that adopt labor-displacing 
innovations to automate work, or the owners of the underlying 
intellectual property on labor-displacing innovations.
d. Taxing Businesses That Automate
The most often discussed tax proposal along these lines is the so-
called “robot tax.”309 In an interview, Bill Gates discussed two versions 
                                                                                                                     
306. Cf. Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 248, at 303 (noting that tax incentives have many of 
the same advantages as intellectual property rights as innovation incentives).
307. A ban on IP for labor-displacing innovations might lower prices for downstream 
consumers, who might also be workers. Id. at 371 (“[P]atent rights operate as shadow taxes that 
enable patentees to charge prices above marginal cost.”).
308. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the 
Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667, 667 (1994) (“[R]edistribution 
through legal rules offers no advantage over redistribution through the income tax system and 
typically is less efficient.”).
309. For critique of a robot tax from the “productivity is everything” perspective, see Hemel,
supra note 237 (“The concern that motivates most of these robot tax proposals . . . is that robots 
will replace human labor as an input into the production process, leading to higher unemployment 
and economic inequality.”).
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of this tax.310 The first version would tax business profits derived from 
adopting robots, or other types of labor-displacing innovations, in lieu of 
humans.311 The second version would tax the robots’ owners at the same 
rate the robots would have been taxed if they were human workers.312
Gates explained this version of the robot tax idea as follows:
Right now, the human worker who does, say, $50,000 worth 
of work in a factory, that income is taxed and [society] get[s] 
income tax, social security tax, all those things. If a robot 
comes in to do the same thing, you’d think that we’d tax the 
robot at a similar level.313
Professors Ryan Abbott and Bret Bogenschneider explain how the 
Gates robot tax might actually be effectuated within the current tax 
system. For example, one seemingly simple option is to disallow 
corporate income tax deductions for capital investments in things like 
robots or automation software that give rise to the tax benefits achieved 
by not having to pay human workers.314
A tax on businesses that adopt labor-displacing innovations has 
several features that make it a potentially attractive solution. First, unlike 
a ban, a tax does not stop companies from automating, but instead forces 
companies to internalize the costs of doing so. While a tax would, to some 
degree, discourage companies from replacing humans with technology, it 
would not totally halt companies’ impulses to adopt productivity-
enhancing innovations or interfere with market forces.315 This helps 
respond to both the Hayekian objection and the “productivity is 
everything” objection, mentioned above.316 Second, because a tax is 
imposed relatively late in a technology’s lifecycle—at the point-of-
adoption rather than the point-of-invention—this alleviates the challenge 
                                                                                                                     
310. See Kevin J. Delaney, The Robot that Takes Your Job Should Pay Taxes, Says Bill 
Gates, QUARTZ (Feb. 17, 2017), https://qz.com/911968/bill-gates-the-robot-that-takes-your-job-
should-pay-taxes/ [https://perma.cc/AU3V-4SPN].
311. “Certainly there will be taxes that relate to automation,” Gates predicted. Id. “Some of 
it can come on the profits that are generated by the labor-saving efficiency there.” Id.
312. See id.
313. Id.; see also Abbott & Bogenschneider, supra note 22, at 149.   
314. Abbott & Bogenschneider, supra note 22, at 169; see also id. at 170–73 (discussing 
several distinct options).
315. See Frischmann, supra note 285, at 382 (“[T]ax incentives have the potential to improve 
market-based efficiency by providing indirect subsidies that align private firms’ incentives in a 
socially desirable fashion.”); see also Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 248, at 328 (“[T]ax 
incentives, like patents, rely on potential innovators—rather than government officials—to decide 
(1) which inventions are worth pursuing and (2) which R&D projects are most likely to yield the 
inventions in question. Like patents, tax incentives cause innovators to pursue inventions that will 
succeed in the market . . . .”).
316. Cf. Hemel, supra note 237 (arguing for a robot subsidy, instead of a robot tax).
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of predicting a technology’s future impact on workers. Third, a tax would 
permit government to collect tax revenues that can be redistributed via 
the tax system to those who are harmed by labor-displacing innovation. 
This is quite significant if a primary reason for regulating is concern over 
unequal distribution of resources in the wake of technological innovation.
e. Taxing Intellectual Property Owners
One alternative is to tax the owners of intellectual property covering 
labor-displacing innovations. For example, Professor Robert Reich 
speculates a universal basic income (UBI) might be “financed out of the 
profits going to . . . labor replacing innovations, or perhaps even a 
revenue stream off of the underlying intellectual property.”317 One 
version of this is a “job displacing intellectual property tax.” This would 
be similar to the job-displacing patent bar described above, except the 
penalty would be a tax on profits, not a denial of the patent. The amount 
of the tax would be proportionate to the profits made from sales or 
licenses of the underlying technology. For instance, if Google owned
intellectual property covering its computer chips used in artificial 
intelligence systems (called TPU chips), and the government classified
these chips as labor-displacing innovations, then Google would have to 
pay a small tax on those profits.318 The assumed effect would be a 
marginal reduction in patenting of labor-displacing inventions, and a new 
stream of revenues from companies that choose to patent labor-displacing 
inventions anyway.319
The labor-displacing intellectual property tax has a few obvious 
advantages over the labor-displacing patent bar. First, the labor-
displacing intellectual property tax would be implemented at the point-
                                                                                                                     
317. Robert Reich, Why We’ll Need a Universal Basic Income, ROBERT REICH (Sept. 29, 
2016), http://robertreich.org/post/151111696805 [https://perma.cc/5NQK-KWYS]; see also
Reich, supra note 272 (discussing the concept of UBI); ROBERT MERGES, JUSTIFYING 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 132–33 (2011) (discussing limited taxation of IP owners as a way to 
force innovators who benefit from IP to give back to society).
318. See Cade Metz, Google Makes Its Special A.I. Chips Available to Others, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/12/technology/google-artificial-intelligence-
chips.html [https://perma.cc/6DGS-VNMM] (discussing Google’s plan to allow other companies 
to buy access to its chips for use in A.I.); see also Reinhardt Krause, In AI Technology Race, 
U.S. Chips May Be Ace-In-The-Hole Vs. China, INV. BUS. DAILY (Nov. 27, 2017),
https://www.investors.com/news/technology/ai -technology-u-s-chip-stocks-vs-china/
[https://perma.cc/8AEF-7TXZ] (“The race is on to build AI chips for data centers, self-driving 
cars, robotics, smartphones, drones and other devices. . . . Google’s TensorFlow data-center 
software runs on its own ‘TPU’ chips.”).
319. See supra Part II.C.1. One complication is that some inventors might choose secrecy,
rather than patenting, to avoid incurring the tax. A way to prevent this type of distortion would be 
to tax income from licensing of intellectual property, including trade secrets, rather than patents 
themselves.  
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of-adoption rather than during the patent application stage. This would 
allow time to see whether the invention is actually adopted in the 
workforce and used to eliminate large numbers of workers, alleviating 
the administrative difficulty in point-of-invention regulation. Second, the 
main agency responsible would be the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), 
not the USPTO. This would assuage some of the concerns discussed 
above about the USPTO’s limited capacity. Third, it would generate tax 
revenues to go towards workers or towards social measures to curb 
automation’s effects, such as education. Thus, even if the reader is not 
convinced that automation generates negative externalities for 
workers,320 she might see significant merit in the idea of a labor-
displacing intellectual property tax from a fairness perspective. 
The labor-displacing intellectual property tax also has some 
advantages over a tax imposed on businesses that automate. First, this 
option may resonate with policymakers interested in helping small 
businesses.321 Businesses that adopt labor-displacing inventions include 
farmers, restaurants, clothing makers, and mom-and-pop establishments 
operating with small profit margins. In contrast, intellectual property 
owners are likely to be larger firms like Uber, Alphabet, and Tesla. 
Second, as discussed in Part I.B, from an economic standpoint, the 
negative externality that gives rise to technological unemployment is 
generated by the new ideas that permit reduction of labor. As explained, 
the “pollution-spewing factory” in this scenario is not the farmer who 
adopts the lettuce harvesting machine; it is the originator of the ideas that 
goes on to experience increased profits due to an exclusive right. Thus, 
even if the tax is ultimately passed on to businesses and consumers, it 
makes greater economic sense to tax the externality at its point of 
origin.322
4.  What to Do with the Proceeds
Once the policymaker decides to pursue a tax and redistribution 
strategy, a separate question is what to do with the proceeds. One 
possibility is to institute a “universal basic income” (UBI). A UBI is a 
guaranteed minimum income in the form of cash paid out to everyone on 
a periodic basis, irrespective of whether they are employed or what their 
income is.323 Several influential thinkers have spoken of a UBI as a 
                                                                                                                     
320. See supra Part III.B.1.
321. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 638 (2012).
322. Acemoglu & Restrepo, supra note 253 (“[T]he social planner will need to impose a tax 
on automation . . . in order to combat the tendency of the decentralized equilibrium to automate 
excessively.”); see supra Part III.B.1.
323. See Fleischer & Hemel, supra note 249, at 1196.
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potential panacea for a jobless future.324 The UBI has usually been 
proposed as a traditional progressive tax, transferring wealth from rich to 
poor.325 But a UBI could also be used in association with a tax on 
innovators. For example, both the robot tax and the job-displacing patent 
tax could be used to fund a UBI.326
Commentators have identified several problems with a UBI. Some 
argue guaranteed subsistence payments may have perverse effects on 
peoples’ incentives to work, and would exacerbate rather than help the 
underemployment problem.327 Others see this as a positive. It could be 
good, Professor Reich suggests, if people could have “more free time to 
do what they want to do instead of what they have to do to earn a 
living.”328
A solution built on guaranteed cash payments is attractive for various 
reasons,329 but of course is not the only option. Another commonly 
discussed option is to use tax proceeds for education and skills training 
in order to help prepare workers to take on new jobs in the wake of rapid 
technological shifts.330 Several commentators believe that improving the 
education system is the key to helping people be able to participate in a 
workforce dominated by computers and AI.331 Education and targeted 
                                                                                                                     
324. Examples include Elon Musk and Robert Reich, discussed herein. See id. at 1199 n.32
(noting fears about automation are a reason for more attention to adopting a UBI).
325. As Professors Fleischer and Hemel explain, a UBI would presumably be drawn from 
richer people, who would pay more in taxes, and then ‘redistributed’ to the less wealthy, who 
would pay less in taxes but receive the same UBI. Id. at 1192 (“[The] UBI is, at its core, a program 
of income redistribution.”).  
326. See Reich, supra note 317 (discussing the possibility of a UBI).
327. Dan Nidess, Why a Universal Basic Income Would be a Calamity, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 
10, 2017, 6:19 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-a-universal-basic-income-would-be-a-
calamity-1502403580 [https://perma.cc/9ACB-6PA2] (“[M]illions of Americans [would]
become dependent on the government and the taxpaying elite.”); see also Fleischer & Hemel, 
supra note 249, at 1248 (“[An] objection to a UBI is that recipients will reduce work effort or 
drop out of the labor force altogether.”).
328. Reich, supra note 317.
329. Some prefer the cash option as supporting both autonomy and efficiency: Recipients 
can spend the cash in ways that work best for them, rather than having to rely on the allocation 
decisions of others with less information. They could, for example, invest it in skills training if 
they wish. See Fleischer & Hemel, supra note 249, at 1234.  
330. See generally CITI GPS, supra note 58, at 115–24 (discussing how the education sector 
can respond to the challenge of skills training). 
331. See, e.g., JOSEPH E. AOUN, ROBOT-PROOF: HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE AGE OF 
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 6–17 (2017) (arguing education needs to adapt to teach people to work 
with AI); BESSEN, supra note 24, at 19–20 (arguing technology policy should include more focus 
on skills training to help workers adapt to new technologies); see also Cade Metz, As China 
Marches Forward on A.I., the White House is Silent., N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/12/technology/china-trump-artificial-intelligence.html
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skills training would not ensure anyone who wants a job can get one. But 
they would at least give people a better opportunity to work if they wish
to do so,332 and aid companies that are having trouble filling their current 
needs for skilled talent.333
Yet of course there are several challenges here too—the most 
significant being that education and skills training are not a solution to 
unemployment caused by complete automation. If that occurs, society
may have no other option besides a UBI. 
5.  Which Level of Government Should be Responsible
A final issue to consider is the question of governmental allocation: 
Which part of the United States government should be responsible for 
crafting and administering a policy to address technological 
un/employment? The author has previously argued that certain kinds of 
innovation policy are better effectuated at the state and local level.334
Local governments may have superior incentives to act on behalf of 
constituents, and superior information about local conditions, such as 
availability and makeup of the workforce.335 Localizing regulation would 
also permit tailoring of policies to different regions. For example, a state 
robot tax could be instituted in Alabama, but not in California. Proceeds 
could be used to train workers in the region.336
On the other hand, a better option might be to institute such taxes at 
the federal level, because this would permit a geographic 
redistribution.337 For example, under a job-displacing patent tax, 
innovators in Silicon Valley, who own more patents than anywhere else 
in the country, would pay taxes; the proceeds would be used to train 
workers in other parts of the country, who are being displaced by those 
                                                                                                                     
[https://perma.cc/72JN-PKSC] (noting that the Obama administration saw educating students in 
AI technologies as a key to improving the U.S.’s global competitiveness). 
332. See, e.g., Claire Cain Miller & Jess Bidgood, How to Prepare Preschoolers for an 
Automated Economy, N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/31/upshot/
how-to-prepare-preschoolers-for-an-automated-economy.html [https://perma.cc/G9JF-CTYR].
333. See supra Part I.C.5 (discussing skills gaps).
334. Hrdy, supra note 40, at 1334.
335. Id.
336. If states decide to tax intellectual property rights, there could be some interesting 
preemption issues. For instance, if a state imposed an 80% tax on certain patents, this would likely 
be preempted by the Intellectual Property Clause and the Patent Act. Camilla A. Hrdy, The 
Reemergence of State Anti-Patent Law, 89 U. COLO. L. REV. 133, 154–55 (2018); see also
MERGES, supra note 317, at 133 (“[A]t some point, tax rates climb so high that, in principle 
anyway, the state may be seen to overstep the proper bounds of its authority.”).
337. See Camilla A. Hrdy, Cluster Competition, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 981, 989 (2016) 
(arguing that the federal government can   use federal funding for emerging innovation clusters to 
“effectuate a geographic redistribution of resources from richer to poorer states”). 
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inventions at higher rates. Even if the tax is instituted at the federal level, 
administration of benefits programs should arguably be done at the local 
level, especially if the proceeds are used for education and skills training. 
Indeed, state and local governments already administer a wide range of 
job creation programs, including skills training, many of them 
specifically directed at developing a suitable workforce for companies in 
the technology sector.338
CONCLUSION
The major focus of IP scholarship has been on whether intellectual 
property promotes innovation.339 But this Article shows that if 
intellectual property is successful in promoting innovation, then by 
necessity intellectual property also facilitates and accelerates the pace of 
technological un/employment: the simultaneous elimination and creation 
of jobs brought about by technological change.
This Article generates two testable hypotheses regarding intellectual 
property’s role. First, the Incentive Effect theorizes that intellectual 
property protection magnifies incentives to generate labor-displacing 
innovations, and thus marginally increases the size of the universe of 
labor-displacing innovations in the economy, and the pace at which they 
come into existence.340 Second, the Distribution Effect theorizes that 
intellectual property, by design, increases returns for intellectual property 
owners and, accordingly, increases demand and wages for those 
employees whose skills are necessary to generate this intellectual 
property; yet at the same time, intellectual property makes it marginally 
more likely that other workers will be replaced by some of those same 
innovations.341 The upshot is that intellectual property exacerbates the 
unequal division of rewards between owners and generators of 
intellectual property, and others whom those inventions replace. 342
To be clear, innovation is generally a very good thing, and has been 
shown to be essential to the economic prosperity of nations.343 The entire 
point of this Article’s use of the term “technological un/employment” is 
that even labor-displacing innovation tends to create new jobs, sometimes 
very good ones, just as it destroys or diminishes old ones.344 But many 
commentators (including the author) are not certain innovation is on net 
                                                                                                                     
338. Hrdy, supra note 40, at 1362–74.
339. See, e.g., MERGES, supra note 317, at 1–11.  
340. See supra Part II.C.1.
341. See supra Part II.C.3.
342. See supra Part II.C.3.  
343. LERNER, supra note 234; see also Hemel, supra note 237 (“To make America 
economically great again, we need a productivity boost.”).
344. See supra Part I.B. 
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going to create more jobs than it displaces in the near future. Moreover, 
commentators are disturbed by the declining quality and distribution of 
available jobs, and the failure of education and skills training 
opportunities to keep pace.345 Some form of policy may be necessary to 
address this situation for purposes of distributive justice if not necessarily 
efficiency.346
Intellectual property represents an underexplored avenue for such a 
policy. As explained, this Article does not support denials of intellectual 
property for labor-displacing inventions. While this strategy (might have) 
made sense in Queen Elizabeth’s time, today’s government has far more 
effective tools. This Article also opposes fully banning labor-displacing 
inventions like autonomous vehicles because this risks unduly hindering 
innovation and exceeds government’s predictive capacities. Instead, this
Article urges more moderate measures. For example, the government 
might impose a small tax on profits from certain intellectual property 
rights covering labor-displacing innovations.347 This tax should have a 
twofold effect: to slow down the pace at which companies pursue labor-
displacing solutions and to permit giving back to workers at least some 
of what they lose through the tax system. The proceeds could be 
distributed in the form of cash or in the form of social programs designed 
to alleviate the negative impacts of job displacement. The government 
cannot and should not stop the tide of market inclinations to innovate, 
even when this leads to more automation of work. At most, the
government should try to marginally alter incentives and focus on 
alleviating the negative impacts on some members of society in the here 
and now. Indeed, slowing things down is arguably the government’s very 
role in this type of circumstance.348
                                                                                                                     
345. See supra Part I.C.
346. See supra Part III.B.
347. As discussed, there are several reasons to prefer a tax on intellectual property owners 
rather than a tax on companies that choose to adopt labor-displacing innovations. See supra Part
III.C.3.c.
348. KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ORIGINS 
OF OUR TIME 39 (2d ed. 2001) (“Why should the ultimate victory of a trend be taken as a proof of 
the ineffectiveness of the [government’s] efforts to slow down its progress? And why should the 
purpose of [government’s] measures not be seen precisely in that which they achieved, i.e., in the 
slowing down of the rate of change?”). 
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